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Abstract
This paper examines the determinants of the timing of public pension policy retrench-
ments in 14 affluent democracies. Available research does not satisfactorily capture the 
multidimensionality of these legislative events, because it relies on indicators of pen-
sion policy provisions for current pensioners even though recent retrenchment pen-
sion reforms have been characterized by phased-in or grandfathering measures. Instead, 
this paper identifies these events by considering the individual long-term implications 
of each pension reform passed in 14 OECD social-insurance countries between 1981 
and 2005. Based on a synthetic review of the pension policy literature, data from fi-
nancial projections, and principles from the economics of welfare programs, I identify 
62 pension retrenchments passed in these countries. My argument is that macroeco-
nomic conditions, the size of the public pension system, and the stage in the electoral 
cycle shape the likelihood of pension retrenchments. Results obtained from conditional 
frailty models for recurrent and sequential events support this argument. The interval 
between pension retrenchments is shorter in countries with low economic growth and 
high public pension spending, as well as in countries in a post-election year.
Zusammenfassung
Dieses Papier betrachtet die zeitlichen Muster von Rentenkürzungen und deren Deter-
minanten in wohlhabenden Demokratien. Die derzeitige Forschung berücksichtigt die 
Multidimensionalität dieser legislativen Maßnahmen nur unzureichend, da sie sich auf 
die Indikatoren für die aktuelle Rentnerpopulation konzentriert, obwohl diese in Zu-
sammenhang mit bereits eingeleiteten oder früheren gesetzlichen Maßnahmen stehen. 
Die vorliegende Studie hingegen bezieht die Langzeitfolgen der Rentenreformen und 
deren Entwicklung in vierzehn OECD Ländern im Zeitraum von 1981 bis 2005 in die 
Analyse ein. Auf der Grundlage einer zusammenfassenden Bestandsaufnahme der Lite-
ratur zur Rentenpolitik, von Daten aus finanziellen Hochrechnungen sowie der ökono-
mischen Prinzipien von  Wohlfahrtsprogrammen werden in diesen Ländern zunächst 
insgesamt 62 Rentenkürzungsmaßnahmen identifiziert. Zur Erklärung der zeitlichen 
Abfolge der Maßnahmen werden die makroökonomischen Bedingungen, die Größe des 
Rentensystems sowie die Zeitpunkte der Anpassungen im Wahlzyklus herangezogen. Die 
unter Anwendung konditionaler Frailty-Modelle erzielten Resultate stützen das Argu-
ment, dass die häufigsten Rentenkürzungen sich in Ländern im Jahr nach der Wahl so-
wie in Ländern mit geringem Wirtschaftswachstum und hohen Rentenausgaben finden.
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How can we account for the numerous retrenchments of public pension generosity in 
affluent democracies? Since the early 1980s, public pension policy has been one of the 
most persistent issues at the top of the reform agenda in all affluent democracies. As a 
result, many pension reforms have been enacted, with one main objective. During this 
period pension policymaking aimed primarily to decelerate pension spending growth 
and strengthen the finances of these programs by retrenching the duration and/or the 
value of pension entitlements (Arza/Kholi 2008: 4; GAO 2005: 3; Kalisch/Aman 1998: 
24; OECD 1998: 52; Pierson 2001a: 427). This “downward drifting trend” in pension 
generosity (Myles/Quadagno 1997: 246) is commonly explained in terms of concerns 
about the fiscal impact of population aging. According to this view, policymakers recog-
nized the expansionary impact of the demographic transition on pension policy costs 
(Immergut/Anderson 2007: 17, 38; Schludi 2005) and reacted by making cutbacks to 
strengthen the long-term financial health of these programs (Castles 2004: 131; Hicks/
Zorn 2005: 626; Hinrichs 2002: 157; Lindert 2004: 203). However, population aging 
may also undermine the chances of pension retrenchments due to the increasing politi-
cal leverage obtained by the elderly (for a review, see Fernandez 2011). Furthermore, 
quantitative research has still not provided solid evidence of a positive relationship be-
tween population aging and reductions in pension generosity in affluent democracies. 
Therefore, the focus on demographic pressures may be hampering our attention to 
more relevant factors. 
Previous quantitative research has not satisfactorily determined the causes of pension 
policy retrenchments in affluent democracies because it employs indicators that can-
not adequately identify these legislative events. Previous studies have relied primarily 
on evidence based on aggregate spending data and synthetic replacement rates (Hicks/
Freeman 2009: 131; Kittel/Obinger 2002: 18; Tepe/Vanhuysse 2009: 7–9), which fail to 
reflect the wide diversity of measures used to retrench pension generosity during the 
previous three decades. Most importantly, these are retrospective indicators that cap-
ture only changes for ongoing beneficiaries. Consequently, they discount changes in 
pension calculation and eligibility rules for prospective beneficiaries, which have con-
stituted central measures of recent pension reforms (Hinrichs 2007: 171; Myles/Pierson 
2001: 331; Weaver 1998: 214–215). In contrast, a forward-looking approach, which ex-
amines the likely consequences of each reform, can be sensitive to changes in all pension 
policy dimensions (Pierson 2001a: 421). It allows us to identify and classify all pension 
reforms according to their impact on individual generosity. 
This paper follows this forward-looking approach by examining the determinants of 
the time that elapses between pension reforms that retrench generosity levels for ongo-
The author would like to thank Bruno Amable, Neil Fligstein, Alexander Hicks, Lothar Krempel, 
Mark Lutter, Edward Palmer, Thomas Paster, Geny Piotti, Dylan Riley, Martin Schröder and attentive 
audiences in the Public Policy Department at Central European University, the Department of Politi-
cal Science and Sociology at Pompeu Fabra University and at the Max Planck Institute for the Study 
of Societies for insightful comments on early drafts. The usual disclaimers apply.
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ing and/or prospective beneficiaries in 14 social-insurance pension systems during the 
1981–2005 period.1 Based on a synthetic review of the pension policy literature, I iden-
tified that these 14 countries passed 62 pension retrenchments during this period. This 
review indicates that the contemporary transformation of public pension programs 
involves a series of recurrent legislative events. In Germany, for instance, the reforms in-
cluded an indexation freeze (1982), a less generous pension calculation formula (1983), 
deductions for early retirement (1989), an increase in the standard retirement age for 
the long-term unemployed (1996), a temporary reliance on price indexation (1999), 
the reduction of the accrual rate (2001), and the incorporation of a demographic factor 
in the calculation formula (2004). Given this complex structure of the data, the appro-
priate analytical strategy consists of conditional frailty models for repeated and sequen-
tial events (Box-Steffensmeier/De Boef/Joyce 2007), which reveal the forces shaping the 
interval elapsed between one pension retrenchment and the next, while controlling for 
event dependence and unit heterogeneity. 
My argument involves both the forces driving the reconsideration of pension retrench-
ments and the political conditions that make these reforms possible. First, economic 
crises and high public pension spending affect these reforms by bringing the pension 
policy issue back onto the government reform agenda. On the one hand, economic 
crises enhance the financial strain of paygo (pay-as-you-go) pension programs, threat-
ening their long-term sustainability and worsening the balance of the state budget. On 
the other hand, there have been increasing concerns that, via generous early retirement 
provisions and high social security contributions, large public pension systems may 
hinder the expansion of the labor force.
Furthermore, policymakers ultimately enact these reform projects because they can 
minimize the political costs associated with these unpopular changes through the stra-
tegic consideration of the electoral calendar. Since voters tend to be less heavily influ-
enced by events that occurred years ago and early on in the electoral cycle (Bartels 2008: 
99–104; Fair 1996: 125), policymakers can expect to suffer less political retribution by 
enacting the pension retrenchment immediately after elections. Therefore, policymak-
ers have an incentive to enact these reforms in the post-election year. 
Supporting this account, the results from the event history analysis indicate that low 
economic growth, the level of public pension spending, and the stage in the electoral cy-
cle are the most robust determinants of the hazard of pension retrenchments. Low eco-
nomic growth and high public pension spending shorten the interval between all forms 
of pension retrenchment, as well as retrenchment pension reforms with and without 
expansionary measures. In addition, in the year immediately after an election there is 
a higher likelihood of all forms of pension retrenchment and pension retrenchments 
without expansionary measures. In contrast, the generalized explanation that pension 
1 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United States.
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retrenchments have been fundamentally affected by the degree of population aging 
finds only weak support in the analysis. Higher projected population aging shortens the 
interval between retrenchments without expansionary provisions. But neither current 
nor projected population aging shapes the interval between all forms of pension re-
trenchment and the interval between net retrenchments with expansionary provisions. 
The analysis is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the importance of retrench-
ments in contemporary pension policymaking. Section 2 discusses the main explana-
tions for the enactment of these reforms. Section 3 identifies the limitations of previ-
ous operationalizations of retrenchments, and Section 4 details the construction of the 
alternative dependent variables. Section 5 discusses the independent variables and the 
analytical approach. Sections 6 and 7 present descriptive statistics of the dependent 
variables, together with the results of the multivariate analysis. Finally, Section 8 sum-
marizes the main findings and discusses their theoretical implications. 
1 The advent of the pension retrenchment era
Since the early 1980s, in all affluent democracies, pension programs have been the sub-
ject of many reforms. During the past three decades, these reforms have pursued diverse 
objectives, including the elimination of regressive and inequitable elements (Levy 1999: 
265), organizational redesigns (Palier/Martin 2008: 14–15), and even improvements in 
coverage (Bonoli 2000: 35). However, during this period cost-cutting goals have pre-
vailed over all other objectives. Cross-national reviews indicate that, since 1980, pen-
sion reforms have chiefly sought to obtain savings in public pension spending (GAO 
2005: 3; Kalisch/Aman 1998: 24; Lindbeck 2003: 51; OECD 1998: 52). As Pierson notes, 
“in the case of health and pensions, … cost containment is the issue in most countries” 
(2001a: 427) (italics in original).
In light of recent reviews, the main pension policy measures passed since 1980 have 
involved increases in the minimum and standard pensionable age, restrictions on early 
retirement pension benefits, expansion of the reference period for calculation purposes, 
changes from flat-rate to means-tested benefits, the adoption of less generous index-
ation mechanisms, the harmonization of rules affecting public sector and private sector 
employees, and increases in caregiver credits. Of these measures, only the last can be 
expected to have expansionary outcomes. All the others have been introduced to reduce 
pension spending by retrenching coverage and benefit levels (Gern 2002: 445–447; Gil-
lion 2000: 583–597; Hinrichs 2007: 161–167; Weaver 1998: 200–209). 
Supporting the claim that pension policymaking has entered into a distinct retrench-
ment era, a recent OECD (2007: 63–65) study demonstrates that, as a result of the re-
forms passed during the 1990s, projected pension replacement rates are expected to fall 
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substantially in 13 out of the 16 countries under consideration (see also McHale 1999: 
31). Thus, the two defining features of pension policymaking during the post-oil crisis 
era have been cost-cutting goals and the enactment of cutbacks in program generosity.2 
Responding to the fact that generosity retrenchments have been a critical – albeit not 
the only – development in the pension policy arena since the early 1980s, the rest of the 
paper focuses on the forces shaping these policy events. 
2 Theoretical background
Regarding the causes of pension reform, most analysts concur that the institutional, de-
mographic, and economic conditions of the post-oil crisis period have brought about 
a dramatic transformation in the forces driving pension policy change (for reviews, see 
Green-Pedersen 2002: 44; van Kersbergen 2002: 6). It is widely held that, during the 
three decades after World War II, pension generosity changes occurred in response to 
redistributive struggles between social classes and reflected the power of organized la-
bor (Hicks 1999: 242–243; Huber/Stephens 2001: 66–71; Kangas/Palme 2007: 122–126; 
Myles 1989; Palme 1990). But most analysts now agree that, since the early 1980s, in-
creased satisfaction with mature pension programs has contributed to the deactivation 
of partisan struggles in this policy field (Huber/Ragin/Stephens 1993; Pierson 1994: 29, 
47; 1997: 274–278),3 while the pressures for reform have instead emanated from adverse 
current and prospective fiscal scenarios brought about by population aging and dwin-
dling economic growth rates (Goul Andersen 2001: 121–127; Myles 2002: 148–151). 
In this regard, scholars usually conceptualize contemporary pension policy reforms as 
having occurred in two stages. In the first stage, exogenous shocks – including popula-
tion aging, deindustrialization, and low economic growth – force the return of this 
policy domain to the government reform agenda. After policymakers or cabinet mem-
bers realize that the situation and prospects of public pension programs constitute a 
policy problem, they initiate a second stage. In this stage, the content of the draft bill and 
its ultimate enactment depend on the strategies and capacity of policymakers to diffuse 
short- and medium-term opposition to the policy changes (Immergut/Anderson 2007: 
38; Schludi 2005: 245). This section discusses dominant accounts of the first economic 
stage before reviewing the dynamics in the second stage. 
2 Indeed, the topic of retrenchment figures so prominently in academic and policymaking discus-
sions that they have become synonyms for “pension reform” (Arza/Kohli 2008: 4; Starke 2008: 10).
3 Supporting this approach, most large-N studies report a lack of (Huber/Stephens 2001: 217; 
Kittel/Obinger 2002: 45) or limited (Hicks/Freeman 2009: 135) partisan effects on contempo-
rary pension generosity changes. 
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Structural conditions and the arrival of the pension issue  
on the policy agenda
Structural conditions, such as the demographic and fiscal scenarios, have figured prom-
inently in analyses of pension policy reform since the early 1980s. It is commonly sug-
gested that demographic, economic, and fiscal pressures have not only been a source of 
objective financial strain in pension programs, but also catalysts for the reconsideration 
of retirement income arrangements. Some analysts have claimed that pension retrench-
ments responded to these three combined pressures (Immergut/Anderson 2007: 17, 38; 
Weaver 1998: 196–200), while other analysts have stressed the importance of each of 
these three dimensions. Yet, according to all of them, structural conditions are critical 
in understanding these legislative events. 
It is justified to open the discussion with the role of demographic pressures because they 
have received particularly intense attention over the past 25 years. Since traditional pay-
go pension programs consider only past wages – and not life expectancy – for benefit 
purposes, they are automatically affected by the level of population aging. In countries 
with paygo programs the continuously increasing proportion of the elderly population 
necessarily accelerates the growth of public pension program outlays. Furthermore, it 
is well known that the challenge posed by demographic change varies across affluent 
democracies and is particularly intense in continental European countries with social 
insurance systems, where the pace of the transition is faster. As a result, population 
aging creates pressures to ensure the sustainability of public retirement income provi-
sion via changes in pension policy provisions. Given the prominent causal connection 
between aging and pension spending, most experts believe that the impact of demo-
graphic change has been decisive in contemporary pension policy retrenchments. Ac-
cording to this view, policymakers recognized the scope of this challenge and passed 
or consented to pension generosity cutbacks to decelerate future pension expenditure 
growth (Hicks 1999: 20; Hicks/Zorn 2005: 656; Lindert 2004: 204; OECD 1998: 51; 
Schludi 2008: 221; van Kersbergen 2002).4 In this regard, Castles writes that “the re-
forms that have been taking place are, of course, substantively motivated by an aware-
ness of the dangers posed by high degrees of benefit generosity in the context of aging 
populations” (2004: 131).
Economic pressures have also been underlined by pension policy experts, albeit to a lesser 
extent than demographic pressures. Under this approach, exogenous shocks produced by 
low economic growth, deindustrialization, and high unemployment affect fiscal balances 
and induce the reevaluation of retirement income provisions. Cyclical or chronic eco-
nomic crises worsen the financial health of pension programs and public deficits, which 
creates a need to rebalance these budgets through changes in social security policy.5 
4 For a critical view of this approach, see Scherer (1996) and Myles and Pierson (2001: 308).
5 The concepts of “social security deficit” or “pension program deficit” cannot be generalized to 
all countries in the sample. The concept is applicable to those systems that were originally de-
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Several authors have suggested that the lower economic growth rates since the late 
1970s, partially produced by deindustrialization, have made it increasingly difficult to 
finance expanding welfare costs (Esping-Andersen 1999: 145–146; Pierson 2001b: 86), 
mainly because they undermine the resources needed to fund welfare programs. Poor 
economic growth depresses consumption levels, harming consumption tax revenues 
and making it more difficult to compensate deficits in pension programs through di-
rect state transfers. Low economic growth also stalls the growth of real wages, reducing 
payroll tax revenues that constitute the leading funding mechanism for public pension 
provision in these countries. Finally, poor economic growth produces unemployment 
growth, which can be especially detrimental to the solvency of welfare state programs. 
On the one hand, unemployment growth reduces the pool of wages that make pay-
roll contributions. On the other hand, unemployment growth boosts pension outlays 
by shedding older workers from the labor market. For these two reasons, Huber and 
Stephens argue that “the timing and severity of cuts in welfare state entitlements are 
primarily driven by unemployment” (2001: 225; also 2006: 124). In sum, because low 
economic growth and high unemployment exacerbate fiscal strains, they are perceived 
to provide strong incentives to contain welfare commitments (Myles/Quadagno 1997: 
247; Palier/Martin 2008: 12). 
Beyond their roots in economic crises, fiscal pressures for welfare reform have also ema-
nated from concerns about the negative macroeconomic implications of large public 
deficits. In this regard, since the mid-1980s there has been an increasing awareness that 
public deficits expand the public debt, inflation rates, and higher long-term interest 
rates (Tanzi/Fanizza 1996: 250), while they reduce the room to maneuver for tackling 
new social risks (Streeck 2007: 34). In response to these concerns, OECD governments 
have sought to reduce their public deficits through cuts in public spending (Boltho/
Glyn 2006: 419; Boltho 1994: 81; Posner/Bovbjerg 1996: 142–143), which may also have 
affected pension programs. In this connection, Holzman and Hinz write that “pension 
reforms in most countries of the world are initially driven by short-term budgetary 
pressures” (2005: 23).
Moreover, these fiscal pressures may have been further reinforced by the process of Eu-
ropean economic integration. The convergence criteria for entry to the European Mon-
etary Union posed an extraordinary fiscal challenge for several accession candidates, 
especially peripheral Continental ones. This exogenous institutional pressure created a 
premium on large public deficits, forcing these countries to consider drastic measures 
that might undercut their primary deficits. In this context, due to their sheer size, public 
pension programs became a prime target of retrenchment reforms (Ferrera 2005: 117; 
signed to be self-financing (for example, the US system), so that gaps in revenues must be com-
pensated by transfers from the Treasury. However, in mixed systems, designed to be financed 
by a combination of social security contributions and income taxes (for example, Canada and 
Sweden), the difference between outlays and social security contributions cannot be taken as an 
indication of deficits in the programs. 
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Pierson 1997: 289; Pitruzzello 1997: 1626–1627). “The de facto agenda of Continental 
welfare states in the 1990s responded to the requirements of fiscal consolidation im-
posed by the Maastricht criteria” (Scharpf 2000: 116).6
The institutional structure of the pension system and the pension policy issue
Although most scholars consider demographic and economic pressures to be the main 
sources of contemporary pension policy reform, other authors have instead emphasized 
the influence of the institutional structure of the pension system. To Myles and Pierson, 
“the key variable shaping broad reform outcomes is the scope, maturity, and design of 
these paygo pension schemes” (2001: 307). In this regard, since the mid-1980s there 
have been widespread concerns about the unintended negative consequences of large-
scale public pension spending for the expansion of employment levels, which have bol-
stered pressures for reform in these countries. According to these concerns, a large pub-
lic pension effort does not help to tackle the chronic problems of high unemployment 
and low participation rates in many Western European countries due to its association 
with generous early retirement provisions and high social security contributions. 
First, it is widely claimed that public pension systems with large programs have built-in 
incentives for early retirement. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, several countries in-
troduced or expanded early retirement provisions to cushion the social costs of the post 
oil-crisis employment declines (Ebbinghaus 2000, 2006). However, even when econom-
ic activity recovered, these provisions persisted, encouraging older workers’ withdrawal 
from the labor force, artificially limiting the recovery of pre-oil crisis employment levels 
(Holzmann 1988: 60; Gruber/Wise 1999: 1).
Moreover, extensive public pension provision demands large social security contribu-
tions that are also deemed harmful for the expansion of the labor supply. Many policy-
makers and analysts concur with Esping-Andersen in arguing that “heavy social contri-
butions and taxes … make the hiring of additional workers prohibitively costly and the 
labor market inflexible” (1996a: 3, 7; see also Coe 1985; Scharpf 1986; Flora 1985: 27–28). 
Nevertheless, of all taxes, social security contributions should be particularly detrimental 
to employment growth. This is because, in low productivity sectors, higher labor costs 
resulting from higher social security contributions cannot be absorbed by reductions in 
employees’ wages. This makes many companies uncompetitive and increases unemploy-
ment among the low-skilled (Kemmerling 2002; Scharpf 1997, 2000: 80–82).
Reflecting the widespread attention paid to the economic impact of pension programs, 
case studies reveal that, in systems with high social security contributions, such as 
France, Germany and Sweden, public pension finances have actually been strengthened 
6 For a more skeptical view of the role of the EU in welfare policy, see Taylor-Goody (2008).
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by reductions in the generosity of the system in order to prevent further erosions of 
employment levels (Anderson 2005: 99; Conceição-Heldt 2007: 179; Hinrichs 2005: 56). 
In contrast, countries with moderate social security contribution rates, such as Canada, 
still had room of maneuver to strengthen public pension finances through payroll tax 
increases (Béland/Myles 2005: 267). In sum, due to perceptions regarding their unin-
tended macroeconomic consequences, large and mature paygo pension programs may 
increase the likelihood of pension retrenchments. 
The second stage: Blame-avoidance strategies and policy-making with an eye 
to the electoral cycle 
According to the broad consensus in pension politics analysis, when the executive 
launches a retrenchment project, its eventual outcome is determined by the dynamics 
of a second stage. In this stage, the content of the law and its ultimate enactment hinges 
upon the strategies and interactions of the government, political parties, and social 
partners. 
This stage has received considerable scholarly attention due to the specific nature of 
pension retrenchment projects. Following the “new politics” theory (Pierson 1994: 17–
19, 1997: 274–278), there is widespread consensus that pension policy retrenchments 
generate more concentrated losses than wins. This makes these projects perilous politi-
cal undertakings, so that governments and policymakers strive to minimize the politi-
cal costs they might incur. In particular, this means that politicians pursue or endorse 
these reforms only if they can devise cautious strategies to diffuse the political blame 
(Weaver 1986). Recent scholarship following the “new politics” theory identifies two 
main blame-avoidance strategies used to prevent the derailment of pension retrench-
ment projects. First, a concertational policymaking style greatly increases the chances 
of reform enactment (Hinrichs 2000: 368; Reynaud 2000: 9–10). By incorporating a 
particular labor union’s demands or by building up a broad partisan consensus, gov-
ernments foster labor’s acquiescence to the cutbacks and undercut the possible partisan 
exploitation of the proposal (Bonoli 2000: 37–38; Natali/Rhodes 2004: 23; Schludi 2005, 
2008). Second, long transition periods and grandfather clauses also facilitate the reform 
process (Pierson 1997: 277). Such clauses lower the visibility of the changes and concen-
trate the costs on younger adults, who tend to follow pension policy developments less 
closely (Bonoli/Palier 2008: 37).
Building on this literature, this paper hypothesizes that the strategic consideration of 
the electoral calendar constitutes another critical blame-avoidance strategy in the poli-
tics of pension retrenchment. Initiating the legislative process immediately after elec-
tions allows governments to undercut the political costs associated with such reforms. 
Most importantly, this strategy capitalizes on voters’ myopia, or the greater importance 
attached by voters to recent events rather than events long past. The notion of voter 
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myopia was introduced by political economists of the “political business cycle approach” 
(PBC), who argue that voters’ short-term memory bias can influence the timing and 
content of economic policy-making. In particular, the earliest contributions of PBC 
suggest that politicians exploit their informational asymmetries with voters by artifi-
cially stimulating the economy in election years (Nordhaus 1975: 184; Tufte 1978: 9). 
Politicians are aware of the medium-term economic downturn produced by these tem-
porary expansions of aggregate demand, while voters are only aware of the positive 
short-term consequences of these measures. Consequently, policymakers can expect to 
boost their chances of reelection if they engage in fiscal expansion in election years 
(Persson/Tabellini 1990; Rogoff/Sibert 1988: 4). In support of this expectation, most 
empirical research shows that, in affluent democracies, public deficits tend to increase 
in election years (Alesina/Roubini 2000: 207; Mink/Haan 2006: 207; for a review, see 
Drazen 2000: 96).7
The PBC assumption of voter myopia offers a valuable clue for the analysis of retrench-
ment (blame-avoidance) politics. It suggests a cognitive mechanism linking the stage in 
the electoral cycle and blame-avoidance strategies. Due to this myopia, voters tend to 
discount past conditions. They give more weight to economic and political events which 
occurred just before the elections than to events which occurred years before, early in the 
electoral cycle. This argument is supported by analyses of the relations between econom-
ic conditions and voting decisions. Economic conditions in the election year are stronger 
predictors of the incumbent’s electoral performance than economic conditions during 
the whole term in the US (Bartels 2008: 99–104; Bartles/Zaller 2001: 15; Fair 1996: 126; 
Hibbs 1987a: 182–183) as well as in other industrial democracies (Hibbs 1987b; Lewis-
Beck/Paldam 2000: 115; Nannestad/Paldam 1994: 238). The implication for retrench-
ment politics is that the possibilities of avoiding political blame vary across the electoral 
cycle. If reforms are enacted right after a new government comes into office, the risk of an 
electoral backlash should be smaller than if they are passed closer to the next elections. In 
other words, due to voter myopia in performance assessment, policymakers act rationally 
by rolling back pension generosity early on in the electoral cycle.
Together with the cognitive mechanism, there is also an organizational mechanism link-
ing the stage in the electoral cycle and blame-avoidance strategies. Because voters rely 
heavily on media organizations to obtain political information and establish their party 
and policy preferences, these preferences depend on the coverage of political issues in 
the mass media. Thus, during election campaigns, when political coverage is intense, 
voters should have better knowledge of political issues (Gelman/King 1993). However, 
between elections, when parties do not have to dramatize the differences between their 
political platforms, the mass media generally reduce their coverage of national politics, 
7 Alt and Lassen (2006: 530) only found a political budget cycle in low-transparency affluent 
democracies, while Shi and Svensson (2006: 1372) found no evidence of it in developed coun-
tries.
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making it more difficult for voters to identify relevant policy events.8 Due to this cycle 
of politicization–depoliticization, policymakers can expect to face less of a popular out-
cry if they pass pension retrenchments in non-election years. 
When considering the enactment of unpopular measures, recently (re)elected govern-
ments can also benefit from the legitimacy bestowed by their electoral victory. In this 
regard, several analysts of neoliberal policymaking have claimed that incoming govern-
ments enjoy a “honeymoon period,” when governments are better equipped to enact 
controversial reforms because popular “support is high and opposition is muted” (Hag-
gard/Webb 1993: 159; Williamson/Haggard 1994: 571). In this line of reasoning, other 
scholars have also noted that a landslide victory provides an exceptional opportunity 
to a reform-minded incoming government (Alesina/Drazen 1991: 1183; Keeler 1993: 
436). Although this scholarship focuses on the role of this legitimacy mechanism in the 
context of changes in office or landslide victories, it can be generalized to any form of 
(re)elected government (Frye/Mansfield 2004).9 In the first months after the elections, 
governments benefit from additional political capital conferred by their election victory. 
Such extraordinary legitimacy can be used to initiate legislative discussions regarding 
key campaign proposals, less-noticed items of the winners’ platform or even problems 
that were not openly discussed during the election campaign. 
In sum, once policymakers become persuaded of the need for retrenchment, they take 
advantage mainly of voters’ cognitive bias to reduce the political costs of such measures 
by passing them right after the elections. Thus, this study presents the hypothesis that 
pension policy retrenchments are more likely in the years immediately after elections than 
in any other year of the electoral cycle. After discussing the factors shaping the likelihood 
of pension retrenchments, we turn our attention to the properties of available indica-
tors of pension generosity. 
3 Limitations of previous operationalizations of welfare retrenchment
Retrenchment pension reforms are multidimensional legislative events that affect a wide 
range of provisions and have consequences in different time horizons. Therefore, any 
reliable indicator of these reforms should be sensitive to this multidimensionality. Such 
an indicator should capture modifications to both eligibility conditions (that is, tighten-
ing up access and shortening the duration of benefits) and pension determination rules 
(that is, calculation formulas for entry pensions and the revalorization of ongoing ben-
8 Consistent with this claim, studies on the UK and Denmark demonstrate that in election years 
voters are more knowledgeable of party platforms and economic conditions than in non-elec-
tion years (Andersen/Tilley/Heath 2005: 292; Paldam/Nannestad 2000). 
9 With regard to a credit-claiming policy, Frye and Mansfield show that the probability of trade 
liberalization decreases linearly during the electoral cycle (2004: 374).
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efits). Moreover, such an indicator should also be sensitive to the fact that many reforms 
concentrate their impact on the medium and long terms. Indeed, the historically long 
implementation time-lags of pension policymaking (Pierson 1994: 14; Allan/Scruggs 
2004: 499) have been bolstered by recent measures. Pension reforms passed since 1980 
have been characterized by grandfather or phasing-in clauses that have further loosened 
the temporal tie between the enactment and the effective changes in pension generosity 
(Hinrichs 2007: 171; Weaver 1998: 214–215).10 In many cases, decades may pass before 
the full individual-level impact of retrenchment pension reforms materializes.
In this sense, conventional indicators of welfare policy generosity – including aggregate 
expenditure data, decreases in expenditure, average and synthetic replacement rates 
(SRR), generosity indexes, proxies of structural reforms and other indicators of wel-
fare policy change – can shed significant light on one or more dimensions of pension 
policy retrenchment. For instance, SRR reflect changes in the value of entry-level pen-
sions. However, in isolation, these six indicators fail to encompass all the dimensions of 
pension generosity that have been affected by recent cutbacks. As a result, they tend to 
underestimate the number of retrenchments. 
The prevalent data source in cross-national welfare state analysis is aggregate expen-
diture data (e.g. Castles 2004: 9; Kittel/Obinger 2002: 18). Its ubiquity derives from its 
ready availability, as well as its (delayed) sensitivity to expansionary changes in eligibil-
ity rules, calculation formulas, and population aging. However, as an empirical basis 
for identifying pension retrenchments this evidence (as well as average replacement 
rates) has two critical drawbacks: (a) it can only reflect cutbacks if their short-term 
consequences surpass spending growth driven by programmatic maturation; and (b) it 
remains insensitive to changes for prospective retirees. Even an indicator of retrench-
ments like sudden and sharp falls in spending (Hicks 1999: 215; Hicks/Zorn 2005: 641–
644) disregards many pension policy changes, since it, similarly, cannot reflect the long-
term consequences of recent reforms. 
To control for programmatic maturation effects, as an alternative to expenditure-based 
data many scholars have relied on SRR (Korpi/Palme 2003: 432–433; Scruggs 2006: 352). 
This indicator provides accurate estimates of benefit generosity for new beneficiaries 
with stable characteristics because it controls for changes in the mass of recipients and 
the economic business cycle. Even so, SRR disregard changes in future pension benefits, 
which, as mentioned above, have prevailed in recent pension reforms. An additional 
limitation of SRR and generosity indexes is that these indicators discount cuts via reval-
orization mechanisms for ongoing pensioners and via changes in eligibility rules.11 The 
10 In fact, as a result of the maturation effects and strategic behavior of older workers, in the short 
term spending can grow faster after the enactment of a pension retrenchment.
11 For these reasons, Allan and Scruggs (2004: 499) disregarded the analysis of changes in synthetic 
pension replacement rates as proxies of the retrenchments that were enacted during the 1980s 
and 1990s.
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result is that proxies derived from expenditure data and those developed from benefits 
for new beneficiaries largely underestimate the number of legislative events involving 
pension retrenchment.12
In contrast to the six types of indicators discussed so far, proxies of retrenchment based 
on microeconomic projections and foreseeable individual-level implications of reform 
are not restricted to certain aspects of welfare generosity. If they build on sufficiently 
detailed measures and provisions, these indicators can simultaneously capture changes 
in eligibility conditions and pension calculation rules. By doing so, they allow us to as-
sess the net impact of expansionary and retrenchment provisions. Furthermore, since 
they incorporate future consequences into the analysis, they solve the problem of the 
implementation lag mentioned above. Consequently, a forward-looking approach rep-
resents a viable solution to the misidentification of phased-in reforms. Forward-looking 
indicators ultimately shift the focus of analysis from indicators of welfare generosity to 
actual government decisions manifested in legislative events. 
Due to these properties, projection-based research has the highest potential to improve 
our understanding of the causes and consequences of welfare retrenchments. “There 
is probably no substitute for investigations that pay attention to fairly detailed dimen-
sions of policy change, including attempts to map their (perhaps uncertain) long-term 
implications” (Pierson 2001a: 421). Following this line of reasoning, Green-Pedersen 
(2002: 60–62) operationalized the scope of welfare retrenchments through quantitative 
projections of budgetary effects, while Chand and Jaeger (1996), McHale (1999) and 
OECD (2007: 64–76) examined the long-term effects of recent changes on individual 
generosity.
Nevertheless, one drawback of a forward-looking approach is that it is very primary- 
data intensive. To construct continuous indicators, detailed information is required on 
pension provisions, working histories, and economic scenarios. For this reason, studies 
relying on projection-based data only cover small samples of countries. Given these 
conditions, to extend this approach within the constraints imposed by limited primary 
data, this paper utilizes three dichotomous indicators of pension retrenchment that 
draw on the secondary literature to identify the likely consequences of changes in pen-
sion policy provisions. Section 4 describes the construction of the dependent variables. 
12 Moreover, an indicator of pension retrenchment focusing on structural reforms such as privati-
zations or NDC (notional defined contributions) reforms cannot capture parametric retrench-
ments (Brooks 2002, 2008), which account for most of the changes in affluent democracies. 
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4 The alternative operationalization of pension retrenchments
This study conceptualizes pension retrenchments as discrete legislative events that, in 
the short and/or long run, reduce the duration and/or the generosity of public retire-
ment income benefits for most citizens affected by the reform (for equivalent defini-
tions, see Green-Pedersen 2007: 17; Starke 2008: 19–20).13 Moreover, this study uses 
three dichotomous dependent variables to distinguish (i) all forms of pension retrench-
ment, (ii) pension reforms with only retrenchment provisions, and (iii) net pension 
retrenchments that include expansionary measures. Using dichotomous dependent 
variables is the only viable option for examining the expected implications of recent 
pension reforms in a sufficient number of countries. The limited number of economic 
projections and the lack of primary data needed to estimate new projections (for ex-
ample, contribution histories, detailed demographic distribution, and full descriptions 
of pension provisions) prevent the construction of continuous and comprehensive in-
dicators for many countries. Even so, available projections and predictions from the 
economics of welfare policy offer a reliable foundation on which to identify generosity 
retrenchments among pension reforms. Furthermore, they allow a response to the dif-
ferent magnitudes of such cuts by distinguishing more radical reforms, without ex-
pansionary measures, from less radical net retrenchment reforms, which include both 
retrenchment and expansionary provisions.14 
To ensure the comparability of the cases, the sample includes 14 affluent democracies 
with social-insurance public pension systems (Bonoli/Shinkawa 2005: 6; Hinrichs 2000: 
358). While Beveridge systems seek to prevent elderly poverty, social insurance pension 
systems seek primarily to maintain workers’ past income levels. Within this general 
framework, the main policy instrument of social insurance pension systems are manda-
tory earnings-related programs, financed mainly through social security contributions 
and the paygo mechanism. In these systems entitlements are (more or less) positively 
related to past wages, so that the system only produces moderate redistribution across 
income groups. The analysis considers all pension reforms passed in these 14 countries 
between 1981 and 2005.
The process of constructing the dependent variable involved two steps. First, I identified 
all pension reforms passed in these 14 countries during the period under study. Second, 
I distinguished those reforms that had a net retrenchment impact for most of the af-
fected citizens. A critical precondition of producing a comprehensive list of pension 
retrenchments is the identification of all the pension reform packages and provisions 
13 This is what Pierson terms “programmatic retrenchment” (1994: 15).
14 By quantitatively analyzing legislative events of pension retrenchment, this study builds on the 
pioneering work of Maestri (1994) and, especially, Alber (1986: 101–104), who used univari-
ate correlations to describe the number of pension reforms passed, respectively, in Italy and 
Germany during the postwar period. Shortly before this paper went to print, the author found 
out that Petring (2010) has also conducted an analysis of pension policy changes as qualitative 
events. 
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passed in the 14 countries. To meet this precondition, I conducted a systematic review 
of the pension policy literature. A systematic review has the advantage of providing 
“an organized way of handling information from a large number of study findings un-
der review” (Lipsey and Wilson 2000: 6; also Torgerson 2003). For the review, I first 
constructed a coding protocol to classify all the provisions noted in case studies. This 
protocol includes 13 subdimensions and three general pension policy dimensions: (i) 
conditions of eligibility, (ii) the pension calculation formula, and (iii) the indexation 
mechanism (Table 1).
The protocol constituted a road map for reviewing the pension policy studies. A bur-
geoning literature on social security and pension policy offers a wealth of detailed de-
scriptions of recent legislation, furnishing dependable primary evidence for identifying 
pension reforms and changes in the 13 policy subdimensions. To collect this evidence I 
examined four main types of sources: first, I analyzed a minimum of six case studies per 
country; second, I examined numerous comparative studies on pension policymaking 
(e.g. Immergut, Anderson/Schulze 2007); third, I studied all the annual issues of key 
comparative reports and datasets (European Commission, several years; Fondazione 
Rodolfo De Benedetti-Institut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 2009; ISSA, several years; OECD, 
several years; Scruggs 2004; Social Security Administration, several years). Finally, for a 
few concrete reforms, domestic experts provided me with detailed descriptions of the 
changes. In all, more than 480 publications were analyzed.15 
The fact that reform packages could combine retrenchment and expansionary provi-
sions made it necessary to isolate pension reforms (and not individual provisions) as 
the unit of analysis. To do this, after taking note of all the provisions described in these 
sources, I determined which of the reforms had a net retrenchment effect. All the iden-
tified provisions were included in 118 reform packages. 
 To classify the reforms, I relied on two types of evidence: principles of the economics 
of welfare provision and microeconomic projections. Economists agree on the expected 
individual consequences of practically all parametric changes produced by recent re-
forms (Table 1). There is a consensus that tightening eligibility criteria (for example, 
increasing minimum contributory periods and pensionable ages) shortens the dura-
tion of benefits. It is also widely held that increases in the pension-calculation refer-
ence period, reductions in the accrual rate, and a change from wage to price indexation 
undermine the individual pension promise. Therefore, these principles provide a solid 
foundation for classifying many reforms. Based on these principles, if the reform pack-
age only includes expansionary or retrenchment measures, I could confidently classify 
it as either a retrenchment or a non-retrenchment event. 
15 A list of these measures and the evidence I used to classify each reform comprise a 60-page 
documentation that cannot be included here due to its length. 
Ta
b
le
 1
 
M
ai
n
 e
le
m
en
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
co
d
in
g
 p
ro
to
co
l a
n
d
 d
at
a 
ex
tr
ac
ti
o
n
 s
h
ee
t 
D
im
en
si
o
n
O
p
er
at
io
n
al
iz
at
io
n
 o
f 
re
tr
en
ch
m
en
t
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 s
tu
d
ie
s 
su
p
p
o
rt
in
g
 t
h
is
 in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
o
n
Q
u
al
if
yi
n
g
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s
M
in
im
u
m
 q
u
al
if
yi
n
g
 p
er
io
d
Ex
p
an
si
o
n
 in
 t
h
e 
p
er
io
d
Li
n
d
b
ec
k 
an
d
 P
er
ss
o
n
 (
20
03
: 1
06
–1
07
);
 G
A
O
 (
20
05
: 1
1–
12
);
 
H
o
lz
m
an
 (
19
88
: 6
8–
75
)
M
in
im
u
m
 p
en
si
o
n
ab
le
 a
g
e 
– 
m
en
Ex
p
an
si
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
p
en
si
o
n
ab
le
 a
g
e
Li
n
d
b
ec
k 
an
d
 P
er
ss
o
n
 (
20
03
: 1
06
–1
07
);
 O
EC
D
 (
20
07
: 5
6–
62
);
 
G
A
O
 (
20
05
: 1
1–
12
)
M
in
im
u
m
 p
en
si
o
n
ab
le
 a
g
e 
– 
w
o
m
en
Ex
p
an
si
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
p
en
si
o
n
ab
le
 a
g
e
Li
n
d
b
ec
k 
an
d
 P
er
ss
o
n
 (
20
03
: 1
06
–1
07
);
 O
EC
D
 (
20
07
: 5
6–
62
);
 
G
A
O
 (
20
05
: 1
1–
12
)
Ex
p
ec
te
d
 p
en
si
o
n
ab
le
 a
g
e 
– 
m
en
Ex
p
an
si
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
p
en
si
o
n
ab
le
 a
g
e
B
ar
r 
(2
00
2:
 3
3)
; W
h
it
ef
o
rd
 a
n
d
 W
h
it
eh
o
u
se
 (
20
06
: 8
9–
92
)
Ex
p
ec
te
d
 p
en
si
o
n
ab
le
 a
g
e 
– 
w
o
m
en
Ex
p
an
si
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
p
en
si
o
n
ab
le
 a
g
e
B
ar
r 
(2
00
2:
 3
3)
; W
h
it
ef
o
rd
 a
n
d
 W
h
it
eh
o
u
se
 (
20
06
: 8
9–
92
)
C
al
cu
la
ti
o
n
 f
o
rm
u
la
Y
ea
rs
 t
ak
en
 in
to
 c
o
n
si
d
er
at
io
n
In
cr
ea
se
 in
 t
h
e 
ye
ar
s 
ta
ke
n
 in
to
 c
o
n
si
d
er
at
io
n
W
h
it
ef
o
rd
 a
n
d
 W
h
it
eh
o
u
se
 (
20
06
: 8
9–
92
);
 O
EC
D
 (
20
07
: 
56
–6
2)
; G
A
O
 (
20
05
: 1
1–
12
);
 H
o
lz
m
an
 (
19
88
: 6
8–
75
)
Pa
st
-w
ag
es
 in
d
ex
at
io
n
 m
ec
h
an
is
m
A
n
y 
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
 s
u
sp
en
si
o
n
 o
r 
p
ar
ti
al
 o
r 
to
ta
l  
tr
an
si
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 w
ag
e 
to
 p
ri
ce
 in
d
ex
at
io
n
W
h
it
ef
o
rd
 a
n
d
 W
h
it
eh
o
u
se
 (
20
06
: 8
9–
92
);
 O
EC
D
 (
20
07
: 
56
–6
2)
A
cc
ru
al
 r
at
e
R
ed
u
ct
io
n
s 
in
 t
h
e 
ac
cr
u
al
 r
at
e
Li
n
d
b
ec
k 
an
d
 P
er
ss
o
n
 (
20
03
: 1
06
–1
07
);
 O
EC
D
 (
20
07
: 5
6–
62
);
 
H
o
lz
m
an
 (
19
88
: 6
8–
75
)
M
ax
im
u
m
 p
en
si
o
n
R
ed
u
ct
io
n
s 
in
 t
h
e 
m
ax
im
u
m
 p
en
si
o
n
H
o
lz
m
an
 (
19
88
: 6
8–
75
)
Y
ea
rs
 n
ee
d
ed
 f
o
r 
m
ax
im
u
m
 a
cc
ru
al
 r
at
e
Ex
p
an
si
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
ye
ar
s 
n
ee
d
ed
H
o
lz
m
an
 (
19
88
: 6
8–
75
)
Pe
n
al
iz
at
io
n
 f
o
r 
ea
rl
y 
re
ti
re
m
en
t
Ex
p
an
si
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
p
en
si
o
n
 w
it
h
d
ra
w
n
  
fo
r 
ea
ch
 y
ea
r 
o
f 
ea
rl
y 
re
ti
re
m
en
t
H
o
m
o
g
en
iz
at
io
n
 o
f 
p
en
si
o
n
 c
al
cu
la
ti
o
n
 f
o
rm
u
la
C
o
n
ve
rg
en
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
ru
le
s 
fo
r 
sm
al
le
r, 
p
ri
vi
le
g
ed
  
fu
n
d
s 
to
w
ar
d
s 
th
e 
m
ai
n
 s
o
ci
al
 s
ec
u
ri
ty
 f
u
n
d
R
ev
al
o
ri
za
ti
o
n
 m
ec
h
an
is
m
A
n
y 
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
 s
u
sp
en
si
o
n
 o
r 
p
ar
ti
al
 o
r 
to
ta
l  
tr
an
si
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 w
ag
e 
to
 p
ri
ce
 in
d
ex
at
io
n
Li
n
d
b
ec
k 
an
d
 P
er
ss
o
n
 (
20
03
: 1
06
–1
07
);
 W
h
it
ef
o
rd
 a
n
d
 
W
h
it
eh
o
u
se
 (
20
06
: 8
9–
92
);
 O
EC
D
 (
20
07
: 5
6–
62
);
 G
A
O
 (
20
05
: 
11
–1
2)
; H
o
lz
m
an
 (
19
88
: 6
8–
75
)
20 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 /9
Based on this logic, 51 of the 118 reforms only included expansionary measures. Conse-
quently, I classified them as expansionary reforms. Moreover, one reform was suspend-
ed before implementation (Germany 1997), and another only implemented principles 
set by prior reforms (Sweden 1998). 
All the remaining 65 reforms had at least one retrenchment provision, hence special 
care was taken in determining whether they were ultimately retrenchments, expansion-
ary, or neutral. A large majority of them (43) did not include expansionary measures 
but only generosity decreasing ones. I could find evidence of financial projections for 
seven of these 43 reforms and all confirmed future reductions in pension generosity 
levels. Those 43 reforms were thus classified as retrenchment reforms. 
To classify the remaining 22 events that combined expansionary and retrenchment pro-
visions, I searched for evidence based on econometric projections for the 2020s and 
2030s. If these projections indicate that, as a result of the changes, pension spending 
or the contribution rate will be lower than otherwise, the reform was classified as a 
retrenchment because these savings could be achieved only through cutbacks in gen-
erosity levels.16 Explicit bibliographic references to projections reveal evidence of cost-
cutting effects for 18 of the 22 reforms and expansionary effects for just one reform.17 
Regarding the other three final reforms, no financial projections have been published 
by domestic officials or economists. However, local experts expect the impacts of two 
of them to be, respectively, cost-cutting (Portugal 1993) and cost-expansionary (Greece 
2002).18 Finally, I classified the last reform as cost-expansionary (Belgium 1984).19
In sum, the analysis reveals 62 retrenchment reforms. These events constitute the first 
dependent variable, all forms of retrenchment. Moreover, these 62 legislative events can 
be differentiated into two groups that produce two additional dependent variables. The 
second dependent variable identifies solely the 43 retrenchment reforms without expan-
sionary measures. The third dependent variable distinguishes the 19 net retrenchment 
reforms with expansionary measures. Since this latter group of reforms includes coun-
tervailing expansionary measures, we can expect that they produce less aggressive (or 
more moderate) retrenchments. Section 6 describes longitudinally the enactment of 
these legislative events and provides examples of each type of pension retrenchment. 
16 These savings cannot be attributed to a decline in the number of beneficiaries, which, due to 
population aging, will continue to grow in all countries until the late 2030s.
17 In particular, Austria 1993, 1997, and 2004; Belgium 1996; Finland 1992, 1994, and 2003; France 
2003; Germany 1989 and 2001; Italy 1995 and 1997; Norway 1992 and 2005; Portugal 2002; 
Spain 1985 and 1997; and Sweden 1994. The expansionary reform is Norway 1981.
18 The author is grateful for the expert evaluations provided through personal correspondence 
by Walter Quintelier (Belgium), Manos Matsaganis (Greece), Markus Knell (Austria), Mika 
Vidlung (Finland), Rune Ervik (Norway), and Elisa Chuliá (Portugal).
19 In this case, of the two main provisions, substantial improvements in the minimum pensions 
of civil servants and the self-employed can be expected to outweigh the moderate reduction in 
costs produced by limitations on the accumulation of pension rights beyond 45 years of em-
ployment.
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5 Independent variables and analytical strategy
Independent variables
It is now possible to present the independent variables of the event history analysis. Fol-
lowing Hicks and Zorn (2005: 649, 2007), the baseline models include economic growth, 
unemployment rate, public treasury balance, deindustrialization, public pension spend-
ing, and trade openness. As already mentioned, according to the dominant economic 
approach, lower economic growth and lower public treasury balance and a higher un-
employment rate should boost the likelihood of a pension retrenchment. Furthermore, 
according to Iversen (2001: 328, 2005: 188), the poor skill transferability of industrial 
workers makes them particularly supportive of welfare generosity, which entails that re-
trenchments should be less likely under conditions of a low level of deindustrialization. 
Pressures for welfare reform from growing international competition are measured 
by the level of trade openness, but also foreign direct investment openness (for a review, 
see Brady/Beckfield/Seeleib-Kaiser 2005). The final macroeconomic variable is public 
pension spending. If the neo-institutionalist approach is correct and the maturity and 
scope of paygo programs affects the chances of pension retrenchments, this should be 
reflected in the impact exerted by the overall size of public pension spending. Average 
GDP per capita has not been included in the models because contemporary theoreti-
cal accounts of pension policy retrenchments do not predict an important role for the 
level of affluence and GDP per capita is highly multicollinear with all other economic 
variables.20
As already mentioned, to most observers, population aging has increased the risk of re-
trenchments through current and prospective levels of pension spending. Consequently, 
the share of elderly population addresses pressures emanating from the size of the cur-
rent elderly population, while the old-age dependency ratio in 2025, which is based on 
biannual projections by the United Nations (several years), considers the ratio of the 
elderly to the active-age population at the peak of the demographic transition.
To address the political conditions possibly affecting the passage of pension retrench-
ments, seven variables have been included. Among these political dimensions, partisan 
politics have absorbed a great deal of interest in past comparative welfare state research. 
Following the convention in this literature, I use proxies of the power of left and Chris-
tian Democratic families of parties in the executive (Brady/Beckfield/Seeleib-Kaiser 
2005: 927; Huber/Stephens 2001: 55). If partisan politics still drive policymaking in 
the pension retrenchment era, the proportions of left cabinet portfolios and Christian 
Democratic cabinet portfolios should be inversely related to pension retrenchments. 
20 Even so, additional models – available upon request – indicate that the inclusion of GDP per 
capita does not affect the main findings of this study. 
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Beyond partisan effects, the cross-national diffusion of policy models has been stressed 
as a possible cause of policy change. Brooks (2007: 713) and Müller (2000) demonstrate 
the relevance of the cross-national diffusion of structural pension policy models in 
middle-income countries. Therefore, peer enactment tests the role of diffusion by re-
flecting the weighted number of retrenchments in other countries during the previous 
year. Each retrenchment event in other countries is weighted by the geographic distance 
between their two capitals. This is because neighboring countries tend to have stronger 
cultural similarities and trade relations, as a result of which geographical proximity 
should make a given nation particularly attentive to the policy changes in neighboring 
nations (Simmons/Elkins 2004: 182). 
Moreover, historical institutionalists suggest that political institutions ratified in consti-
tutions, such as bicameral or presidential systems, create opportunities to block reform 
projects. Responding to this expectation, constitutional structure is an index of three 
formal veto points: bicameralism, federalism, and presidentialism. Similarly, legislative 
fractionalization measures the difficulties encountered in passing a legal reform under 
conditions of temporal power dispersion. 
Concerning the strategic consideration of the electoral cycle, Frye and Mansfield (2004: 
378) test the hypothesis of a greater proneness to pass pro-market economic reforms 
immediately after elections through the number of years until the next election. How-
ever, this variable reflects cross-national differences in the length of the electoral cycle 
rather than a strict post-election year effect. To capture only the latter, post-election 
year instead identifies the year after legislative or presidential elections. In addition, the 
effect of the financial criteria laid down in the 1992 Treaty on the European Union is 
measured by EMU candidate. 
Most independent variables have been specified with a one-year lag. However, due to 
their idiosyncrasies, four variables have been specified differently. Economic growth rep-
resents the moving average value in the previous three years, because this is the most 
volatile economic variable, so that a pension reform project started due to a sudden 
downturn may become law after an improvement in the economic conditions. Further-
more, the partisan structure of governments can affect welfare policy reforms through 
long or short time-lags (Huber/Stephens 2001: 60–61). The government party may 
drive pension reform by opting for prompt enactment, but also by opening the debate 
on pension reform or initiating a long legislative process. Thus, to cover these three op-
tions, following Hicks and Zorn (2005: 646), left cabinet portfolios and Christian Demo-
cratic cabinet portfolios represent the mean value in the previous four years. Finally, post-
election year does not include any lags because the hypothesis discussed above predicts 
an instantaneous impact of the stage of the electoral period on the likelihood of reform. 
The Appendix includes definitions, sources, and descriptive statistics for all the inde-
pendent variables (Table A1).
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Analytical approach
Since all the countries under observation experienced at least two retrenchment re-
forms, the dependent variables used in this study involve recurrent events. In addition, 
these recurrent events are ordered or sequential. Pension policy case studies indicate 
that OECD governments launched pension reform project k only when k–1 had been 
passed or aborted. Until recently, the statistical literature recommended the analysis of 
ordered and recurrent events through Cox models with conditional variance-correction 
and risks restarted at the last event (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 157–166; Box-
Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002: 1082; Cleves 2000: 38–39; Cleves/Gould/Gutierrez 2004). 
These models have the valuable property that they eliminate biases in the coefficient 
parameters due to the dependence between events (time dependence). For this reason, 
Hicks and Zorn (2005: 647, 2007) relied on these models in their study of general wel-
fare spending retrenchments. 
However, this analytical strategy does not address a second feature of recurrent events 
data, which is unobserved unit heterogeneity. Some subjects in the analysis may be more 
likely to experience the events than others, and the sources of this heterogeneity may be 
unobserved, which violates the assumption of case independence and could bias the re-
sults. Hence, following recent work by Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2006, 2007), this study 
uses conditional frailty models that provide a valid analytical strategy to simultaneously 
address time dependence and unit heterogeneity. Similarly to other methods of event 
history analysis, conditional frailty models allow us to examine the determinants of the 
hazard rate, which is the probability that an event occurred in one interval, given that 
it did not occur in the previous interval (Blossfeld/Golsch/Rohwer 2007: 33; Petersen 
1991: 456). Therefore, an increase in the hazard rate reduces the time elapsed until the 
next event. But conditional frailty models have two key advantages. They address the 
problem of event dependence by stratifying the analysis by event rank and generating a 
hazard baseline for each event, and the possible presence of unit heterogeneity by cal-
culating, along with the parameter estimates, a frailty or random effect shared by all the 
events of each country (see also Hougaard 2000; Kelly/Lim 2000: 32).
In sum, I fit conditional frailty models with times restarted after each event and strati-
fied events. All models report robust standard errors, grouped by country.21 These mod-
els analyze three dependent variables: (i) all forms of pension retrenchment (that is, net 
retrenchments with or without expansionary provisions); (ii) retrenchment reforms 
without expansionary provisions; and (iii) retrenchment reforms with expansionary 
provisions. The distribution of countries per number of these three types of events 
is positively skewed because most countries do not have many events. Therefore, to 
avoid biases in the baseline hazard produced when few countries have a high number 
of events (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2007: 246), for the three dependent variables I col-
lapsed all the strata for the mean and higher number of events. In the case of the first 
21 Conditional gap time models – available upon request – generate substantially equivalent results.
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dependent variable, all forms of retrenchment, since the average number of events is 
62/14=4.429, all the strata for the fourth or higher event have been collapsed. The frail-
ties are assumed to follow the gamma distribution. The analysis was conducted with the 
software R 2.10.1 (R Foundation for Statistical Computing 2009). 
6 Descriptive results 
It is useful to begin the analysis with a descriptive overview of the pattern of pension re-
trenchments. As noted above, the mean number of all forms of pension retrenchments 
is 4.429. However, most countries deviated from this average. Austria undertook nine 
reforms; Finland eight; Germany seven; Italy six; Belgium, France, Japan, Portugal and 
Sweden four each; Greece and Spain three; and Canada, Norway, and the US only two.22 
In sum, Continental European and Scandinavian countries enacted, in general, more 
retrenchment events than Anglo-Saxon and Southern European countries. 
Figure 1 depicts the number of events enacted during the period under study. The figure 
does not reveal a clear longitudinal increasing or decreasing trend. Instead, we observe a 
cyclical trend, with three historical peaks. The first peak occurred in the early 1980s. The 
second peak was particularly intense and took place between 1992 and 1997. Finally, the 
third peak occurred in the early 2000s. The years 1983 (5), 1992 (6), and 2004 (5) saw the 
largest number of reforms. The persistence of retrenchments in the early 2000s and the 
absence of a clear downward trend suggest that these series of legislative events do not 
constitute a brief pause in the century-long expansion in the generosity of public pension 
provision, but that, on the contrary, the era of pension retrenchments is here to stay. 
To illustrate the content of the reforms, it is useful to evaluate a few cases. Here we will 
consider three events that took place in 1981, 1992, and 2003. In 1981, Sweden intro-
duced a reduction in the benefit levels of partial pensions from 65 percent to 50 percent 
and modified the time span used to uprate the pension index (Anderson/Immergut 
2007: 367). In 1992, Greece approved a new pension calculation formula with a lower 
accrual rate for future retirees, raised the retirement age of women, and downgraded 
the formula for civil servants to the level of private sector employees (Triantafillou 2007: 
134). Finally, in 2003 France introduced a less generous pension indexation mechanism 
for civil servants’ schemes and extended the contribution period necessary to receive a 
full pension (Mandin/Palier 2005: 78). In the three cases, most individuals affected by 
22 Austria 1984, 1987, 1992, 1993, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2004; Belgium 1982, 1986, 1995 
and 1996; Canada 1989 and 1998; Finland 1984, 1987, 1992, 1994, 1995, 2000, 2003 and 2004; 
France 1984, 1987, 1993, 2003; Germany 1982, 1983, 1989, 1996, 1999, 2001 and 2004; Greece 
1983, 1990 and 1992; Italy 1983, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1997 and 2004; Japan 1985, 1994, 1999 and 
2004; Norway 1992 and 2005; Portugal 1993, 2000, 2002 and 2005; Spain 1983, 1985 and 1997; 
Sweden 1981, 1991, 1992 and 1994; United States 1981 and 1983.
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the reform can be expected to suffer a reduction in the duration of their benefits and/or 
the volume of their entitlements. 
Consistent with the multidimensionality of pension policy, the content of the 62 pen-
sion reforms presents large differences. Only two of the reforms are paradigmatic or 
structural (Italy 1995 and Sweden 1994) because they represent a departure from either 
the paygo system or traditional defined-benefit principles of public pension provision, 
whereas 60 reforms are parametric since they do not change the logic and architec-
tural structure of the system. Parametric reforms, furthermore, differed substantially 
in the number of retrenchment provisions. Of all reforms, one-quarter (24.19 percent) 
included only one retrenchment provision, while the large majority (75.81 percent) 
included at least two retrenchment provisions. 
Figure 2 Estimated cumulative hazards for each event number for the conditional frailty  
 model of pension retrenchments in 14 OECD countries
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To gain a better understanding of the pension policymaking process in the welfare re-
trenchment era, we can examine the cumulative hazards by event number, since they 
could provide indications of event dependence across countries. Figure 2 indicates that 
the hazards do not clearly tend to decrease or increase from one event to the next. The 
risk of pension retrenchment is higher after the first event than after the second one 
only for the first years. Moreover, the hazards after the second (third) event are not 
higher than after the third (fourth) event. Therefore, Figure 2 does not provide solid 
evidence of event dependence. But the simulations from Box-Steffensmeier (2007: 243) 
reveal that, in the absence of event dependence, the use of conditional frailty models 
does not bias the parameter estimates. 
7 Multivariate results
All forms of retrenchments
Table 2 presents four models for the passage of pension retrenchments with or with-
out expansionary provisions during the period 1981–2005. Given the predominance 
of socioeconomic explanations in the literature, Models 1 and 2 examine the impact 
of socioeconomic and political dimensions separately. Model 3 combines both socio-
economics and political factors, and Model 4 includes an interaction term. Model 5 
provides an additional sensitivity test. 
According to Model 1, which only considers economic dimensions, low economic 
growth and public pension spending shape the hazard of an event. The coefficients of 
economic growth and unemployment rate have the expected sign, but only economic 
growth is statistically significant. At the 95-percent confidence level, we can assert that 
the risk of a reform decreases with higher economic growth. This is consistent with the 
expectation that economic crises facilitate the enactment of restrictive pension reforms. 
Moreover, public pension spending is positive and significant, which supports the claim 
of neoinstitutionalist scholars that the scope of pension provision matters for cutbacks 
in this policy field. Finally, Model 1 does not reveal a statistical association between 
the current or prospective extent of population aging and the hazard of a retrench-
ment. Contrary to the general understanding that concerns about the financial impact 
of population aging drive these reforms, neither the share of elderly population nor the 
old-age dependency ratio in 2025 has an impact on the dependent variable. Therefore, 
model 1 indicates that low economic growth and high public pension spending reduce 
the time elapsed until the next pension retrenchment. 
Model 1 also includes the variance of the random effect (θ), which allows us to deter-
mine whether some countries are more prone to pension retrenchments than others 
due to unmeasured factors. In Model 1, as well as all the other models in Tables 2 and 3, 
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Table 2 Conditional frailty models for the passage of pension policy retrenchments, 1981–2005
All forms of pension retrenchment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Socioeconomic factors
Economic growth(mean t–3 to t–1) –.310**
(.114)
–.442**
.139)
–.477***
(.144)
–.516***
(.124)
Unemployment rate(t–1) .069
(.053)
.063
(.062)
.074
(.065)
.030
(.059)
Public treasury balance (t–1) –.064
(.051)
–.051
(.052)
–.098
(.060)
Deindustrialization(t–1) –.050
(.044)
–.057
(.055)
–.068
(.056)
–.055
(.051)
Public pension spending(t–1) .278**
(.087)
.288*
(.110)
.359**
(.120)
Trade openness(t–1) .012
(.007)
.010
(.009)
.010
(.009)
.006
(.009)
Foreign direct investment openness(t–1) –.022
(.033)
–.011
(.032)
–.006
(.029)
–.024
(.037)
Elderly population(t–1) –.126
(.120)
.004
(.137)
–.074
(.147)
.100
(.129)
Old-age dependency ratio in 2025(t–1) .073
(.051)
.033
(.063)
.032
(.062)
.038
(.059)
Political factors
Left cabinet portfolios(mean t–4 to t–1) .006
(.005)
.001
(.007)
–.001
(.007)
.010
(.007)
Christian democratic 
cabinet portfolios(mean t–4 to t–1)
.008
(.006)
.001
(.009)
–.001
(.008)
.010
(.007)
Peer enactment(t–1) –.053
(.112)
–.268*
(.133)
–.261
(.136)
–.189
(.128)
Constitutional structure(t–1) .075
(.174)
.169
(.231)
.114
(.227)
.277
(.223)
Legislative fractionalization(t–1) .023
(.016)
.033
(.022)
.039
(.021)
.027
(.021)
Post-election year .874**
(.287)
.892**
(.306)
.866**
(.305)
.941**
(.302)
EMU candidate(t–1) .581
(.433)
.371
(.496)
.401
(.486)
.532
(.467)
Public treasury balance * Maastricht(t–1) .179
(.111)
θ .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
R2 .087 .044 .125 .132 .105
N 350 350 350 350 350
Number of failures 62 62 62 62 62
Likelihood ratio χ² for θ .024 .095 .083 .062 .017
Wald χ² 30.0*** 15.7* 39.5*** 39.0** 33.2**
Key: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3 Additional conditional frailty models, 1981–2005
Only retrenchment 
measures
Mixed provisions, 
but retrenchments 
dominant
Model 1 Model 2
Socioeconomic factors
Economic growth(mean t–3 to t–1) –.465*
(.192)
–.608*
(.295)
Unemployment rate(t–1) –.021
(.080)
.229
(.129)
Public treasury balance(t–1) –.020
(.081)
.069
(.132)
Deindustrialization(t–1) .023
(.072)
–.011
(.125)
Public pension spending(t–1) .440**
(.159)
.837*
(.389)
Trade openness(t–1) .013
(.011)
–.013
(.024)
Foreign direct investment openness(t–1) –.100
(.070)
.048
(.034)
Elderly population(t–1) –.300
(.178)
.215
(.354)
Old-age dependency ratio in 2025(t–1) .180*
(.086)
–.376
(.223)
Political factors
Left cabinet portfolios(mean t–4 to t–1) .001
(.008)
–.032
(.018)
Christian democratic cabinet portfolios(mean t–4 to t–1) .010
(.010)
–.017
(.020)
Peer enactment(t–1) –.263
(.163)
–1.114
(.620)
Constitutional structure(t–1) –.452
(.338)
–.202
(.661)
Legislative fractionalization(t–1) .026
(.031)
.068
(.063)
Post-election year 1.063**
(.391)
–1.072
(.765)
EMU candidate(t–1) .429
(.729)
1.161
(.917)
Public treasury balance * Maastricht(t–1) .124
(.179)
.510*
(.253)
θ .000 .920
R2 .111 .120
N 350 350
Number of failures 43 19
Likelihood ratio χ² for θ .075 .240
Wald χ² 26.4 14.3
Key: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; robust standard errors in parentheses.
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the variance of the frailty is not statistically significant, which means that unobserved 
heterogeneity does not affect the results. In other words, unmeasured factors, such as 
distinctive legislative traditions, do not enhance the hazard of an event in countries 
with more retrenchments.
Model 2 considers the effects of political factors on the timing of pension retrenchments. 
It reveals that only one of the seven variables is significant. At the 95-percent confidence 
level, we can claim that post-election year has a positive association with the hazard of 
retrenchment. In other words, public pension retrenchments were significantly more 
likely immediately after elections than at any other point during the electoral cycle. By 
contrast, all the other political variables prove insignificant. The partisan structure of 
the government does not affect the hazard of a reform, because at the conventional con-
fidence level the proportion of the left and of Christian Democratic cabinet portfolios is 
unrelated to the dependent variable.23 The expectation of a causal role for the diffusion 
of these policy reform projects is not supported either, as the variable peer enactment 
is insignificantly related to the risk of an event. In addition, policy-making institutions, 
including constitutional structure and the level of legislative fractionalization, as well as 
formal EMU candidate status, also display no significant effect. 
One possible concern with the finding that the stage in the electoral cycle is the only po-
litical factor shaping the timing of the passage of pension retrenchment is that this result 
could be influenced by the lack of consideration of economic dimensions in Model 2. 
Model 3, therefore, includes all (non-interacting) variables. Even so, the main findings 
obtained from the previous two models are not substantially affected by the combined 
inclusion of these variables. On the one hand, the partisan structure of government (left 
cabinet portfolios and Christian Democratic cabinet portfolios), the level of population 
aging (elderly population and old-age dependency ratio in 2025), and the rules of the 
legislative process (constitutional structure and legislative fractionalization) have an in-
significant effect on the timing of a retrenchment. On the other hand, economic crises 
(low economic growth), the size of public pension programs (public pension spending), 
and the stage in the electoral cycle (post-election year) remain statistically significant. In 
fact, the coefficients for economic growth, public pension spending, and post-election year 
do not decline from Models 1 and 2 to Model 3.24 In addition, while in Model 3 peer 
enactment is statistically significant, later models reveal that this variable lacks a robust 
significant effect. 
23 The insignificance of the partisan effects is not affected by the specification of left and Christian 
Democratic cabinet portfolio. When these variables are lagged only one year or are the moving 
average of one- and two-year lags, they remain statistically insignificant.
24 Additional univariate models were fitted to examine whether the results were affected by mul-
ticollinearity between the independent variables. However, these provide equivalent results. In 
these models (available upon request), elderly population, dependency ratio in 2025, left cabinet 
portfolios, and Christian Democratic portfolios are insignificant; furthermore, economic growth, 
public pension expenditure, and post-election year are statistically significant and in the same 
direction as the models of Table 3. 
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Model 2 also reveals that, ceteris paribus, having official EMU candidate status does not 
significantly affect the risk of an event. However, the critical expectation of the wel-
fare state literature in this regard is that EMU candidacy has a mediational impact, so 
that the effect of the public deficits should be significantly larger for EMU candidates 
than for non-EMU candidates. Model 4 allows us to test this hypothesis by including 
a public treasury balance *EMU candidate interaction term. In this model, the variable 
public treasury balance is negative but still insignificant. This means that, for non-EMU 
candidates, having a higher public deficit did not increase the risk of a retrenchment. 
Moreover, the interaction term public treasury balance *EMU candidate is also statisti-
cally insignificant. Model 4, therefore, shows that signing the Maastricht Treaty did not 
increase the impact of public deficits on the risk of an event. All the evidence presented 
so far reveals that the timing of all forms of generosity rollbacks in public pension pro-
grams is affected by economic crises, the level of public pension spending, and the stage 
in the electoral cycle. 
How substantial are the effects of the significant variables? Since, despite their statistical 
significance, these variables could have a negligible or insubstantial impact, it is useful 
to examine how possible changes in these independent variables affect the hazard of an 
event. Based on the results from Model 4, Figure 3 presents the predicted changes in the 
hazard of a retrenchment associated with increases in three independent variables. For 
the two continuous variables the percentage change in the hazard rate is produced by 
a standard deviation increase. However, since a standard deviation change is illogical 
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Note: Estimated from Model 4 in Table 3.
Figure 3 Percent change in the hazard of a pension retrenchment produced by a standard  
 deviation increase (economic growth, public deficit and public pension spending) 
 and one-unit increase (post-electoral year)
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for dichotomous variables, for post-election year Figure 3 depicts the percentage change 
in the hazard rate produced by the marginal change. Figure 3 shows that one standard 
deviation increase in the rate of economic growth decreases the hazard of any form of 
pension retrenchment by 50.64 percent. A standard deviation increase in public pen-
sion spending increases such hazard by 142.37 percent. With regard to the stage in the 
electoral cycle, the variable included in the model also has a substantial impact. The 
hazard rate is 137.74 percent higher in post-election years than in any other year during 
the electoral cycle. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the two economic variables 
(economic growth and public pension spending) plus the variable post-election year are 
both statistically and substantially significant. 
Another potential concern with the findings drawn from Models 1–4 is that public pen-
sion spending could absorb part of the effect of other economic or sociopolitical di-
mensions, making the latter insignificant. As hypothesized by Hicks and Zorn, public 
deficits and welfare spending may act as intermediate or “funnel variables” (2005: 652) 
of the ultimate causes of retrenchments. According to their hypothesis of “self-limiting 
immoderation,” unemployment growth and population aging contribute decisively to 
the constant increase in public social spending, facilitating the justification of welfare 
retrenchments as fiscal rebalancing measures. Model 5 in Table 2 addresses this concern 
by dropping the variables public treasury balance and public pension spending. However, 
the evidence indicates that the significant effect of public pension spending does not 
absorb the effect of population aging and the unemployment rate, because in Model 5 
the coefficients for unemployment rate, elderly population, and old-age dependency ratio 
in 2025 do not become positive and significant.
Retrenchment reforms with or without expansionary measures
It is also informative to examine the determinants of the timing of the two types of 
retrenchment reforms: those that do and those that do not include expansionary mea-
sures. These additional analyses contribute to determining the robustness of the find-
ings obtained with regard to all forms of pension retrenchment, as well as the potential 
existence of differences in the causes of less aggressive retrenchment reforms (that is, 
with expansionary provisions) and more aggressive ones (that is, without expansion-
ary provisions). To this effect, Table 3 includes two conditional frailty models for the 
second and third dependent variables. In both cases, the events are ordered or sequen-
tial, because the risk for each type of reform only starts after the positive or negative 
conclusion of the last reform project. Thus, the time risk of a retrenchment without ex-
pansionary provisions restarts after the previous event of that type. Similarly, the time 
risk of a retrenchment with expansionary provisions restarts after the previous event of 
that type. Due to the positive skew in the second and third dependent variables, in both 
cases I also collapsed the strata for the average and higher number of events. 
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Table 3 first considers the dimensions shaping the hazard of a pension retrenchment 
without expansionary provisions. Consistent with the results of Table 2, economic 
growth, public pension spending, and post-election year are still significant and in the 
expected direction. Countries in the year immediately after elections with lower rates 
of economic growth and higher public pension spending have a higher likelihood of a 
retrenchment pension reform without expansionary measures. 
Model 2 examines the factors shaping the time elapsed between net retrenchments with 
expansionary provisions. It shows that lower economic growth and higher public pen-
sion spending also shorten the time elapsed until the next net retrenchment with ex-
pansionary provisions. However, the variable post-election year becomes insignificant in 
this model. Therefore the stage in the electoral cycle does not affect these less numerous 
forms of pension retrenchment. 
Three additional findings from Table 3 also bear mentioning. The generalized expecta-
tion that population aging was a driving force of these reforms finds some weak sup-
port in this table. Although the two proxies for population aging were insignificant 
in all models of Table 2, Table 3 shows that countries with a higher projected old-age 
dependency ratio in 2025 are more likely to pass retrenchments without expansionary 
measures. In addition, concerning the partisan variables, left and Christian Democratic 
cabinet portfolios are insignificantly related to the hazard of pension retrenchments 
with and without expansionary provisions. Finally, the results in Table 3 are also in-
consistent with the expectation that the Maastricht criteria increased the hazard of re-
trenchments in countries with high public deficits.25
8 Discussion
Since the early 1980s, pension policymaking in social-insurance countries has been 
characterized by a series of generosity retrenchments aimed at reducing pension spend-
ing growth. After a century of expansionary reforms in which generosity levels were 
repeatedly ratcheted up, the contemporary period has seen reforms involving retrench-
ments in eligibility and benefit levels. The dataset constructed for this paper reveals that 
most (52.54 percent) of the public pension reforms passed between 1981 and 2005 in 
the 14 affluent democracies considered in this study should be considered generosity 
retrenchments. 
To understand this historical reversal in public pension provision, I have examined the 
forces affecting the timing of contemporary pension retrenchments in social-insurance 
25 According to model 2, for EMU candidate countries, the hazard of a retrenchment with expan-
sionary provisions is actually significantly lower when there is a high public deficit.
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countries. My main argument is that the recurrence of these legislative events is shaped 
mainly by the presence of economic crises, high public pension spending, and the stage 
in the electoral cycle. 
First, this study shows that, in these countries, low economic growth shortens the inter-
val between all forms of pension retrenchments, as well as retrenchments with and with-
out expansionary measures. Poor economic growth is widely perceived as harmful for 
the financial health of paygo programs and overall public finances. Hence this adverse 
economic condition creates incentives for policy changes that can ensure the sustain-
ability of welfare programs and help to rebalance state budgets. Faced with persistently 
low economic growth rates or sudden recessions, in a context of popular opposition to 
tax increases many policymakers consider cutbacks in eligibility and/or benefits to be 
the only possible path of reform. 
Second, in social-insurance countries higher public pension spending shortens the in-
terval between all forms of pension retrenchments, as well as pension retrenchments 
with and without expansionary provisions. Although public pension programs have 
greatly improved the life chances of the elderly (Brady 2004: 66; OECD 2008b: 132), 
there are widespread concerns that higher public pension spending may have an un-
intended negative impact on employment levels, mainly because large social security 
contributions increase the costs of hiring new workers. Thus, in order to avoid further 
erosion of the job supply, policymakers in countries with high public pension spending 
championed or consented to pension retrenchments. 
The third main empirical finding is that the hazards of all forms of pension retrench-
ments and pension retrenchments without expansionary provisions are significantly 
higher in post-election years. Since pension retrenchments are largely unpopular re-
forms, cabinet members and policymakers have to devise strategies to reduce the par-
tisan costs of these changes. This study shows that the strategic consideration of the 
electoral calendar constitutes an important political maneuver to elude political blame 
for welfare retrenchment projects. Initiating the legislative process right after the last 
elections allows policymakers to capitalize on the fact that voters are not likely to give 
a lot of weight to policy events that occur early on in the electoral cycle. Therefore, the 
political retribution for restrictive pension reforms should be smaller if the changes are 
enacted right after the last elections.
In contrast to the strong impact of economic conditions on the likelihood of pension 
retrenchments, partisan politics do not help to account for these reforms. The politi-
cal power of both left parties and Christian Democratic parties does not shape the risk 
of this legislative event. Moreover, the widespread assertion that concerns about the 
financial impact of population aging were catalysts for recent welfare reforms finds 
only weak supportive evidence. A higher level of projected population aging shortens 
the time elapsed until the next pension retrenchment without expansionary measures. 
However, objective levels of both current and prospective aging do not affect the time 
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until all forms of pension retrenchment and pension retrenchment without expansion-
ary measures. This finding suggests that population aging is not only an inevitable de-
mographic trend, but a sociopolitical construction as well. Econometric projections 
provide irrefutable evidence of the expansive impact of aging on pension spending, 
while European citizens recognize the economic challenge posed by the demographic 
transition (Janky/Gál 2007: 3). However, the evidence of this paper reveals that, at least 
for the area of old-age pensions, the objective level of population aging does not have a 
robust translation in the reform agenda of OECD governments. Indeed, policymakers 
of countries facing very different demographic scenarios have invoked the shadow of 
demographic change to justify the need for retrenchments. In this sense, more research 
is needed to determine how population aging is politically constructed. 
More broadly, these findings suggest the transition from a model of interest-based 
pension politics to a model of technocratic pension politics that may be generalizable 
to other domains of welfare, fiscal, and macroeconomic policy. In the interest-based 
model, changes in the selection or calibration of policy instruments respond to the 
mobilization of distinct class interests. These interests are reflected in the normative 
positions and value judgments of policymakers leading the process of reform (Weber 
1994). Closely resembling the interest-based model, welfare policy-making until the late 
1970s mainly sought to ensure the allegiance of the lower classes to the capitalist mode 
of production (Esping-Andersen 1996b: 66; Kohli 2008: 196). 
In the technocratic model of pension politics, instead, rational-instrumental analysis 
represents the critical mechanism for the selection and calibration of policy instru-
ments (Centeno 1993: 313–314; Habermas 1970: 63–67). In this model, a continuous 
evaluation of key economic and social indicators provides the primary evidence that 
helps to define social and policy problems (Kingdon 1984: 95–99). Then, on the basis 
of scientific instruments and available data, decision-makers generate a policy proposal 
that they perceive to be the most efficient solution to attain a complex structure of col-
lective goals. Reflecting the principles of this model, a combination of adverse macro-
economic scenarios and high public pension spending, not class struggles manifested in 
partisan pressures, determined the timing of the enactment of pension retrenchments 
in social-insurance countries. Further research regarding other welfare and fiscal do-
mains would make it possible to map out the prevalence of the technocratic model of 
policymaking. 
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Appendix
Economic growth: Average percentage annual change in GDP per capita in US$ at current prices and 
PPP (reference year 2000) between t–3 and t–1 (OECD 2009).
Unemployment: Total unemployed as a percentage of the civilian active population at t–1 (OECD 
2008a). 
Public treasury balance: Annual surplus of the government primary balance as a percentage of GDP 
at t–1 (OECD 2009). 
Deindustrialization: 100 minus the percentage of the population employed in the agricultural and 
industrial sectors over all the active-age population at t–1 (OECD 2008a).
Public pension spending: Average public spending on old-age pensions as a percentage of GDP at t–1 
(OECD 2008c). 
Trade openness: Sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP at t–1 
(World Bank 2006). 
Foreign direct investment openness: Sum of direct investment in the reporting economy as a percent-
age of GDP and direct investment abroad as a percentage of GDP. The sum is for t–1 (IMF 2009: 
lines 78BED and 78BDD).
Elderly population: Percentage of the population aged 65 or older at t–1 (OECD 2008a). 
Projected old-age dependency ratio in 2025: Expected percentage of the population aged 65 or older 
over the population aged 15 to 64 at t–1. Based on biannual projections (United Nations 1982; 
several years) and interpolated values. 
Left cabinet portfolios: Average percentage of cabinet portfolios held by members of left parties be-
tween t–4 and t–1 (Swank 2009). 
Christian Democratic cabinet portfolios: Average percentage of cabinet portfolios held by members of 
Christian Democratic parties between t–4 and t–1 (Swank 2009).
Peer enactment: Number of retrenchments in other countries than j in t–1 divided by the kilometer 
distance between j and the country of event i. Data for distances between capitals are from 
Mayer and Zignago (2006). Peer enactment = ∑[(1 if event in country i in t–1)/(distance be-
tween j and i)].
Constitutional structure: Because the constitutional structure index of Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 
(2004) is unavailable for many countries and years, an alternative additive index was construct-
ed with data from Keefer (2007). It includes three dimensions: presidentialism (0 if parliamen-
tary, 1 if assembly elected president, 2 if presidentialist); bicameralism (0 if unicameral system, 
1 if bicameral system); and decentralization (1 if states/provinces are constituents of the first 
chamber, 0 if not).
Legislative fractionalization: Index of legislative fractionalization of the party system according to 
Rae’s formula at t–1 (Armingeon 2007). 
Post-election year: Year after the elections for the first or second chamber or presidential elections 
(Keefer 2007).
EMU candidate: Dichotomous variable that differentiates (1) ten signatories of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and 
Sweden) from other years for these countries and all years for other countries (0). For Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain the value is 1 between 1992 and 
1997. For Austria and Sweden the value is 1 between 1995 and 1997.
Fernandez: Economic Crises, High Public Pension Spending, Blame-avoidance Strategies 37
Table A.1 Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables
Mean Standard 
deviation
Minimum 
value
Maximum
value
Dependent variables
All forms of retrenchment .177 .382 0 1
Only retrenching measures .123 .329 0 1
Mixed measures but retrenchments 
predominate
.054 .227 0 1
Independent variables
Economic growth 2.004 1.482 –4.142 7.035
Unemployment 7.829 4.128 1.617 24.171
Public treasury balance –.069 3.491 –9.935 13.526
Deindustrialization 75.934 5.422 59.338 84.671
Public pension spending 7.570 2.466 2.793 12.817
Trade openness 58.990 28.782 16.108 166.353
FDI openness 4.863 12.839 –0.427 182.127
Share of elderly population 14.547 2.120 9.100 19.482
Elderly dependency ratio in 2025 34.024 4.480 23.292 49.576
Left cabinet portfolios 37.624 35.457 0 100
Christian Democratic cabinet portfolios 14.760 24.345 0 100
Peer enactment of “any type of 
retrenchment”
1.457 1.388 0 6.638
Peer enactment of “only retrenching 
measures”
1.018 1.177 0 5.756
Peer enactment of “mixed measures by 
retrenchments predominate”
.440 .727 0 4.908
Constitutional structure 1.466 1.093 0 4.000
Legislative fractionalization 67.470 11.064 40.910 88.976
Post-election year 0.297 0.458 0 1
EMU candidate 0.154 0.341 0 1
N = 350
38 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 /9
References
Alber, Jens, 1986: Germany. In: Peter Flora (ed.), Growth to Limits: The Western European Welfare 
States Since World War II., Vol. 2. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1–114.
Alesina, Alberto/Allan Drazen, 1991: Why Are Stabilizations Delayed? In: The American Economic 
Review 81, 1170–1188.
Alesina, Alberto/Nouriel Roubini, 2000: Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. Cambridge: MIT 
Press.
Allan, James P./Lyle Scruggs, 2004: Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced In-
dustrial Societies. In: American Journal of Political Science 48, 496–512.
Anderson, Karen M., 2005: Pension Reform in Sweden: Radical Reform in a Mature Pension System. 
In: Giuliano Bonoli/Toshimitsu Shinkawa (eds.), Ageing and Pension Reform Around the World. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 94–116.
Anderson, Karen/Ellen M. Immergut, 2007: Sweden: After Social Democratic Hegemony. In: Ellen 
M. Immergut/Karen M. Anderson/Isabelle Schulze (ed.), Handbook of West European Pension 
Politics. Oxford: Oxford University, 349–396.
Armingeon, Klaus, et al., 2007: Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2004. Berne: Institute of Political 
Science, University of Berne.
Arza, Camila/Martin Kohli, 2008: Introduction: The Political Economy of Pension Reform. In: Cami-
la Arza/Martin Kohli (ed.), Pension Reform in Europe: Politics, Policies and Outcomes. London: 
Routledge, 1–23.
Barr, Nicholas, 2002: Reforming Pensions: Myths, Truths, and Policy Choices. In: International Social 
Security Review 55, 3–36.
——, 2006: Pensions: Overview of the Issues. In: Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22, 1–14. 
Bartels, Larry M., 2008: Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of The New Gilded Age. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation.
Bartles, Larry M./John Zaller, 2001: Presidential Vote Models: A Recount. In: Political Science Online 
March, 9–20.
Béland, Daniel/John Myles, 2005: Stasis Amidst Change: Canadian Pension Reform in an Age of 
Retrenchment. In: Giuliano Bonoli/Toshimitsu Shinkawa (eds.), Ageing and Pension Reform 
Around the World. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 252–274.
Blossfeld, Hans-Peter/Katrin Golsch/Götz Rohwer, 2007: Event History Analysis with Stata. Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Boltho, Andrea, 1994: Why Do Countries Change Their Fiscal Policies? Western Europe in the 1980s. 
In: Journal of International Comparative Economics 3, 77–99.
Boltho, Andre/Andrew Glyn, 2006: Prudence or Profligacy: Deficits, Debit, and Fiscal Consolidation. 
In: Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22, 411–425.
Bonoli, Giuliano, 2000: The Politics of Pension Reform: Institutions and Policy Change in Western Eu-
rope. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bonoli, Giuliano/Bruno Palier, 2008: When Past Reforms Open New Opportunities: Comparing 
Old-Age Insurance Reforms in Bismarckian Welfare States. In: Bruno Palier/Claude Martin 
(eds.), Reforming the Bismarckian Welfare Systems. Malden: Blackwell, 21–40.
Bonoli, Giuliano/Toshimitsu Shinkawa, 2005: Population Ageing and the Logics of Pension Reform 
in Western Europe, East Asia and North America. In: Giuliano Bonoli/Toshimitsu Shinkawa 
(eds.), Ageing and Pension Reform Around the World. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1–24.
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet/Bradford S. Jones, 2004: Event History Analysis: A Guide for Social Scientists. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet/Suzanna De Boef, 2006: Repeated Events Survival Models: The Conditional 
Frailty Model. In: Statistics in Medicine 25, 3518–3533.
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet/Christopher Zorn, 2002: Duration Models for Repeated Events. In: Journal 
of Politics 64, 1069–1094.
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M./Suzanna De Boef/Kyle A. Joyce, 2007: Event Dependence and Heteroge-
neity in Duration Models: The Conditional Frailty Model. In: Political Analysis 15, 237–256. 
Fernandez: Economic Crises, High Public Pension Spending, Blame-avoidance Strategies 39
Brady, David, 2004: Reconsidering the Divergence Between Elderly, Child, and Overall Poverty. In: 
Research on Aging 26, 487–510.
Brady, David/Jason Beckfield/Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, 2005: Economic Globalization and the Welfare 
State in Affluent Democracies, 1975–2001. In: American Sociologica. Review 70, 921–948.
Brooks, Sarah M., 2007: When Does Diffusion Matter? Explaining the Spread of Structural Pension 
Reforms Across Nations. In: The Journal of Politics 69, 701–715. 
Castles, Francis G., 2004: The Future of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Centeno, Miguel Angel, 1993: The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy. In: 
Theory and Society 22, 307–335.
Chand, Sheetal K./Albert Jaeger, 1996: Aging Population and Public Pension Schemes. IMF Occasional 
Paper 147. Washington, DC: IMF.
Cleves, Mario, 2000: Analysis of Multiple Failure-time Data with Stata. In: Stata Bulletin 9, 30–40.
Cleves, Mario A./William W. Gould/Roberto G. Gutierrez, 2004: An Introduction to Survival Analysis 
Using Stata. College Station, TX: Stata Corporation.
Coe, David T., 1985: Nominal Wages, the NAIRU and Wage Flexibility. In: OECD Economic Studies 
5, 87–126.
Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia da, 2007: France: The Importance of the Electoral Cycle. In: Ellen M. Im-
mergut/Karen M. Anderson/Isabelle Schulze (eds.), Handbook of West European Pension Politics. 
Oxford: Oxford University, 150–203.
Diamond, Peter, 2002: Social Security Reform. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Drazen, Allan, 2000: The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years. In: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 
15, 75–117.
Ebbinghaus, Bernhard, 2000: Any Way Out of ‘Exit from Work’? Revising the Entrenched Pathways 
of Early Retirement. In: Fritz W. Scharpf/Vivien A. Schmidt (eds.), Welfare and Work in the 
Open Economy, Vol. II: Diverse Responses to Common Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 511–554.
——, 2006: Reforming Early Retirement in Europe, Japan and the USA. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, 1996a: After the Golden Age? Welfare State Dilemmas in a Global Economy. 
In: Gøsta Esping-Andersen (ed.), Welfare States in Transition. London: Sage, 1–32.
——, 1996b: Welfare States without Work: The Impasse of Labour Shedding and Familialism in Con-
tinental European Social Policy. In: Gøsta Esping-Andersen (ed.), Welfare States in Transition: 
National Adaptations in Global Economies. London: Sage, 66–88.
——, 1999: Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
European Commission, several years: Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC): 
Social Protection in the EU Member States and the European Economic Area. Brussels: European 
Commission.
Fabel, Oliver, 1994: The Economics of Pensions and Variable Retirement Schemes. Chichester: John 
Wiley & Sons.
Fair, Ray C., 1996: The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President: 1992 Update. In: Political 
Behavior 18, 119–139.
Fernandez, Juan, 2011: Population Aging, the Elderly, and the Generosity of Standard and Minimum 
Pensions. In: Achim Goerres/Pieter Vanhuysse (eds.), Generational Politics. London: Routledge 
(forthcoming).
Ferrera, Maurizio, 2005: The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics 
of Social Protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Flora, Peter, 1985: On the History and Current Problems of the Welfare State. In: S. N. Eisenstadt/Ora 
Ahimeir (eds.), The Welfare State and Its Aftermath. London: Croom Helm, 11–31.
Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti, 2009: FRDB Social Reforms Database. Milan: Fondazione Rodolfo 
DeBenedetti.
Frye, Timothy/Edward D. Mansfield, 2004: Timing is Everything: Elections and Trade Liberalization 
in the Postcommunist World. In: Comparative Political Studies 37, 371–398.
GAO (Government Accountability Office), 2005: Social Security Reform: Other Countries’ Experi-
ences Provide Lessons for the United States. Washington, DC: GAO.
40 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 /9
Gelman, Andrew/Gary King, 1993: Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So Vari-
able When Votes Are So Predictable? In: British Journal of Political Science 23, 409–451.
Gern, Klaus-Jünger, 2002: Recent Developments in Old Age Pension Systems: An International Over-
view. In: Martin Feldstein/Horst Siebert (eds.), Social Security Pension Reform in Europe. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 439–479.
Gillion, Colin, et al., 2000: Social Security Pensions: Development and Reform. Geneva: International 
Labour Organization.
Goul Andersen, Jørgen, 2001: Change without Challenge? Welfare States, Social Construction of 
Challenge and Dynamics of Path Dependency. In: Jochen Clasen (ed.), What Future for Social 
Security? Amsterdam: Kluwer Law International, 121–138.
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, 2002: The Politics of Justification: Party Competition and Welfare-State 
Retrenchment in Denmark and the Netherlands from 1982 to 1998. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Uni-
versity Press.
——, 2007: More than Data Questions and Methodological Issues: Theoretical Conceptualizations 
of the Dependent Variable ‘Problem’ in the Study of Welfare Reform. In: Jochen Clasen/Nico A. 
Siegel (eds.), Investigating Welfare State Change: The ‘Dependent Variable Problem’ in Compara-
tive Perspective. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 13–24.
Gruber, Jonathan/David A. Wise, 1999: Introduction and Summary. In: Jonathan Gruber/David A. 
Wise (eds.), Social Security and Retirement around the World. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1–37.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1970: Towards a Rational Society. Boston: Beacon. 
Haggard, Stephan/Steven B. Webb, 1993: What Do We Know About the Political Economy of Eco-
nomic Policy Reform? In: World Bank Research Observer 8, 143–168.
Hibbs, Douglas A., 1987a: The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
——, 1987b: The Political Economy of Industrial Democracies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
Hicks, Alexander, 1999: Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism: A Century of Income Security Poli-
tics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Hicks, Alexander/Christopher Zorn, 2005: Economic Globalization, the Macro Economy, and Rever-
sals of Welfare: Expansion in Affluent Democracies, 1978–1994. In: International Organization 
59, 631–662.
——, 2007: Errata, Revisions and Data: ‘Economic Globalization, the Macro Economy, and Reversals 
of Welfare Expansion in Affluent Democracies, 1978–1994.’ In: International Organization 61, 
465–465.
Hicks, Alexander/Kendralin Freeman, 2009: Pension Income Replacement: Permanent and Transi-
tory Determinants. In: Journal of European Public Policy 16, 127–143.
Hinrichs, Karl, 2000: Elephants on the Move: Patterns of Public Pension Reform in OECD Countries. 
In: European Review 8, 353–378.
——, 2002: Ageing and Public Pension Reforms in Western Europe and North America: Patterns 
and Politics. In: Jochen Clasen (ed.), What Future for Social Security? Debates and Reforms in 
National and Cross-National Perspective. Bristol: Policy Press, 157–179.
——, 2005: New Century – New Paradigm: Pension Reforms in Germany. In: Guiliano Bonoli/
Toshimitsu Shinkawa (eds.), Ageing and Pension Reform Around the World: Evidence from Eleven 
Countries. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 47–74.
——, 2007: Ageing and Public Pension Reforms in Western Europe and North America: Patterns 
and Politics. In: Jochen Clasen (ed.), What Future for Social Security? Debates and Reforms in 
National and Cross-National Perspective. New York: Policy Press, 157–179.
Holzmann, Robert, 1988: Reforming Public Pensions. Paris: OECD.
Holzmann, Robert/Richard Hinz, 2005: Old Age Income Support in the 21st Century. Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
Hougaard, Philip, 2000: Analysis of Multivariate Survival Data. New York: Springer.
Fernandez: Economic Crises, High Public Pension Spending, Blame-avoidance Strategies 41
Huber, Evelyne/John D. Stephens, 2001: Welfare State and Production Regimes in the Era of Re-
trenchment. In: Paul Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 107–145.
——, 2006: Combating Old and New Social Risks. In: Klaus Armingeon/Michelle Beyeler (eds.), The 
Politics of Post-Industrial Welfare States. London: Routledge, 143–169.
Huber, Evelyne/Charles Ragin/John D. Stephens, 1993: Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, 
Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State. In: American Journal of Sociology 99, 711–749.
——, 2004: Comparative Welfare State Data Set. New York: Graduate Center, City University of New 
York, Luxembourg Income Study Center.
Huber, Evelyne/John D. Stephens, 2001: Development and Crisis of the Welfare State. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
IMF (International Monetary Fund), 2009: International Financial Statistics. Washington, DC: IMF.
Immergut, Ellen M./Karen M. Anderson, 2007: Editor’s Introduction: The Dynamics of Pension Pol-
itics. In: Ellen M. Immergut/Karen M. Anderson/Isabelle Schulze (eds.), The Handbook of West 
European Pension Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–49.
Immergut, Ellen M./Karen M. Anderson/Isabelle Schulze (eds.), 2007: Handbook of West European 
Pension Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
ISSA, several years: Social Security News. In: International Social Security Review.
Iversen, Torben, 2001: The Dynamics of Welfare State Expansion: Trade Openness, De-industrial-
ization, and Partisan Politics. In: Paul Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of Welfare States. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 45–80.
——, 2005: Capitalism, Democracy and Welfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Janky, Béla/Róbert I. Gál, 2007: Public Opinion on Pension Systems in Europe. ENEPRI Research Re-
ports 36. Brussels: The Centre for European Policy Studies.
Kalisch, David W./Tetsuya Aman, 1998: Retirement Income Systems: The Reform Process across OECD 
Countries. OECD Ageing Working Papers 3.4. Paris: OECD.
Kangas, Olli/Joakim Palme, 2007: Social Rights, Structural Need and Social Expenditure: A Com-
parative Study of 18 OECD Countries 1960–2000. In: Jochen Clasen/Nico A. Siegel (eds.), Inves-
tigating Welfare State Change: The ‘Dependent Variable Problem’ in Comparative Analysis. Chel-
tenham: Edward Elgar, 106–133.
Keefer, Philip, 2007: DPI 2006 Database of Political Institutions. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Keeler, John T. S., 1993: Opening the Window of Reform: Mandates, Crises, and Extraordinary Poli-
cy-Making. In: Comparative Political Studies 25, 433–486.
Kelly, Patrick J./Lynette L-Y. Lim, 2000: Survival Analysis for Recurrent Event Data: An Application 
to Childhood Infectious Diseases. In: Statistics in Medicine 19, 13–33.
Kemmerling, Achim, 2002: The Employment Effects of Different Regimes of Welfare State Taxation: 
An Empirical Analysis of Core OECD Countries. MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/8. Cologne: Max 
Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
Kersbergen, Kees van, 2002: The Politics of Welfare State Reform. In: Swiss Political Science Review 
80, 1–20. Kingdon, John, 1984: Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company.
Kittel, Bernhard/Herbert Obinger, 2002: Political Parties, Institutions, and the Dynamics of Social 
Expenditure in Times of Austerity. MPIfG Dicusssion Paper 02/1. Cologne: Max Planck Institute 
for the Study of Societies.
Kohli, Martin, 2008: Generational Equity: Concepts and Attitudes. In: Camila Arza/Martin Kohli 
(eds.), Pension Reform in Europe: Politics, Policies and Outcomes. London: Routledge, 197–214.
Korpi, Walter/Joakim Palme, 2003: New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and 
Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries, 1975–1995. In: American Political Science 
Review 97, 425–446.
Levy, Jonah D., 1999: Vice into Virtue? Progressive Politics and Welfare Reform in Continental Eu-
rope. In: Politics and Society 27, 239–273.
Lewis-Beck, Michael S./Martin Paldam, 2000: Economic Voting: An Introduction. In: Electoral Stud-
ies 19, 113–121.
42 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 /9
Lindbeck, Assar/Mats Persson, 2003: The Gains from Pension Reform. In: Journal of Economic Lit-
erature XLI, 74–112.
Lindert, Peter, 2004: Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Cen-
tury. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lipsey, Mark W./David B. Wilson, 2000: Practical Meta-Analysis. London: Sage.
Maestri, Giovanni Ezio, 1994: Rappresentanza degli Interessi, Partiti e Consenso: Giungla Pensionistica, 
Clientelismo e Competizione Politica in Italia. Milano: FrancoAngeli.
Mandin, Chirstelle/Bruno Palier, 2005: The Politics of Pension Reform in France: The End of Excep-
tionalism? In: Giuliano Bonoli/Toshimitsu Shinkawa (eds.), Ageing and Pension Reform Around 
the World. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 74–94.
Mayer, Thierry/Soledad Zignago, 2006: Distances: Geographic Data for Estimation of Gravity Equa-
tions. Paris: CEPII. <www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm>.
McHale, John, 1999: The Risk of Social Security Benefit Rule Changes: Some International Evidence. 
NBER Working Paper 7031. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Mink, Mark/Jakob de Haan, 2006: Are There Political Budget Cycles in the Euro Area? In: European 
Union Politics 7, 191–211.
Müller, Katharina, 2000: The Political Economy of Pension Reform in Central-Eastern Europe. Chel-
tenham: Edward Elgar.
Myles, John, 1989: Old Age in the Welfare State: The Political Economy of Public Pensions. Lawrence, 
KS: University Press of Kansas.
——, 2002: A New Social Contract for the Elderly? In: Gøsta Esping-Andersen (ed.), Why We Need a 
New Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 130–173.
Myles, John/Jill Quadagno, 1997: Recent Trends in Public Pension Reform: A Comparative View. In: 
Keith Banting/Robin Boadway (eds.), Reform of Retirement Income Policy: International and 
Canadian Perspectives. Kingston: Queen’s University, 247–273.
Myles, John/Paul Pierson, 2001: The Comparative Political Economy of Pension Reform. In: Paul 
Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 305–334.
Nannestad, Peter/Martin Paldam, 1994: The VP-Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and 
Popularity Functions after 25 Years. In: Public Choice 79, 213–245.
Natali, David/Martin Rhodes, 2004: The ‘New Politics’ of the Bismarckian Welfare State: Pension Re-
forms in Continental Europe. European University Institute Working Papers SPS 2004/10. Flor-
ence: EUI.
Nordhaus, William D., 1975: The Political Business Cycle. In: Review of Economic Studies 42, 169–190.
OECD, 1998: Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society. Paris: OECD.
——, 2007: Pensions at a Glance 2007: Public Policies across OECD Countries. Paris: OECD.
——, 2008a: Annual Labor Force Statistics. Paris: OECD.
——, 2008b: Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries. Paris: OECD.
——, 2008c: Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), 1980–2005. Paris: OECD.
——, 2009: Economic Outlook Electronic Database. Paris: OECD.
——, several years: OECD Economic Surveys. Paris: OECD.
Palier, Bruno/Claude Martin, 2008: From a ‘Frozen Landscape’ to Structural Reforms: The Sequen-
tial Transformation of Bismarckian Welfare Systems. In: Bruno Palier/Claude Martin (eds.), Re-
forming the Bismarckian Welfare Systems. Oxford: Blackwell, 1–21.
Palme, Joakim, 1990: Pension Rights in Welfare Capitalism: The Development of Old-Age Pensions in 
18 OECD Countries, 1930 to 1985. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for Social Research.
Persson, Torsten/Guido Tabellini, 1990: Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and Politics. Chur: Har-
wood Academic Publishers.
Petersen, Trond, 1991: The Statistical Analysis of Event Histories. In: Sociological Methods and Re-
search 19, 270–323.
Petring, Alexander, 2010: Reformen in Wohlfahrtsstaaten: Akteure, Institutionen, Konstellationen. 
Wies baden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
Pierson, Paul, 1994: Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fernandez: Economic Crises, High Public Pension Spending, Blame-avoidance Strategies 43
Pierson, Paul, 1997: The Politics of Pension Reform. In: Keith G. Banting/Robin Boadway (eds.), 
Reform of Retirement Income Policy: International and Canadian Perspective. Kingston: Queen’s 
University, 273–295.
——, 2001a: Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies. 
In: Paul Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
410–457.
——, 2001b: Post-industrial Pressures on the Mature Welfare States. In: Paul Pierson (ed.), The New 
Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 80–107.
Pitruzzello, Salvatore, 1997: Social Policy and the Implementation of the Maastricht Fiscal Conver-
gence Criteria: The Italian and French Attempts at Welfare and Pension Reforms. In: Social 
Research 64, 1589–1637.
Posner, Paul/Barbara Bovbjerg, 1996: Deficit Reduction around the World. In: Eugene Steurle/Masa-
hiro Kawai (eds.), The New World Fiscal Order: Implications for Industrialized Nations. Washing-
ton, DC: The Urban Institute, 135–163.
R Foundation for Statistical Computing, 2009: R version 2.10.1. Vienna University of Economics and 
Business. <www.r-project.org>
Reynaud, Emmanuel (ed.), 2000: Social Dialogue and Pension Reform. Geneva: International Labour 
Organization.
Rogoff, Kenneth/Anne Sibert, 1988: Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles. In: The Review of 
Economic Studies 55, 1–16.
Scharpf, Fritz W., 1986: Strukturen der Postindustriellen Gesellschaft, oder: Verschwindet die Mas-
senarbeitslosigkeit in der Dienstleistungs- und Informationsökonomie? In: Soziale Welt 37, 
4–24.
——, 1997: Employment and the Welfare State: A Continental Dilemma. MPIfG Working Paper 97/7. 
Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
——, 2000: Economic Changes, Vulnerabilities, and Institutional Capabilities. In: Fritz W. Scharpf/
Vivien A. Schmidt (eds.), Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, Vol. I: From Vulnerability to 
Competitiveness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 21–125.
Scherer, Peter, 1996: The Myth of the Demographic Imperative. In: Eugene Steurle/Masahiro Kawai 
(eds.), The New World Fiscal Order: Implications for Industrialized Countries. Washington, DC: 
Urban Institute Press, 61–85.
Schludi, Martin, 2005: The Reform of Bismarckian Pension Systems: A Comparison of Pension Politics 
in Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
——, 2008: The ‘New Politics’ of Pension Reforms in Continental Europe. In: Camila Arza/Mar-
tin Kohli (eds.), Pension Reform in Europe: Politics, Policies and Outcomes. London: Routledge, 
25–47.
Scruggs, Lyle, 2004: Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset: A Comparative Institutional Analysis 
of Eighteen Welfare States, Version 12. Storrs, CT: University of Connecticut.
 <www.sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/wp.htm> (12/10/2006)
——, 2006: The Generosity of Social Insurance, 1971–2002. In: Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22, 
349–364.
Simmons, Beth A./Zachary Elkins, 2004: The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the 
International Political Economy. In: American Political Science Review 98, 171–189.
Social Security Administration, several years: Social Security Programs throughout the World. Wash-
ington, DC: Social Security Administration.
Starke, Peter, 2008: Radical Welfare State Retrenchment: A Comparative Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Streeck, Wolfgang, 2007: Endgame? The Fiscal Crisis of the German State. MPIfG Discussion Paper 
07/7. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
Swank, Duane, 2009: Comparative Political Parties Dataset. Milwaukee: Marquette University. 
 <www.marquette.edu/polisci/faculty_swank.shtml>
Tanzi, Vito/Domenico Fanizza, 1996: Fiscal Deficit and Public Debt in Industrial Countries, 1970–
1994. In: Eugene Steuerle/Masahiro Kawai (eds.), The New World Fiscal Order: Implications for 
Industrialized Nations. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 223–253.
44 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 /9
Tepe, Markus/Pieter Vanhuysse, 2009: Are Aging OECD Welfare States on the Path to Gerontocracy? 
In: Journal of Public Policy 29, 1–28.
Torgerson, Carole, 2003: Systemic Reviews. London: Continuum.
Triantafillou, Polyxeni, 2007: Greece: Political Competition in a Majoritarian System. In: Ellen M. 
Immergut/Karen M. Anderson/Isabelle Schulze (eds.), Handbook of West European Politics. Ox-
ford: Oxford University, 97–150.
Tufte, Edward R., 1978: Political Control of the Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
United Nations, 1982: Demograhic Indicators of Countries: Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 
1980. New York: United Nations.
——, several years: World Population Prospects. Estimated Projections as assessed in [various years]. 
New York: United Nations.
Weaver, R. Kent, 1986: The Politics of Blame Avoidance. In: Journal of Public Policy 6, 371–399.
——, 1998: The Politics of Pensions: Lessons from Abroad. In: R. D. Arnold/M. J. Graetz/A. H. Mun-
nell (eds.), Framing the Social Security Debate. Washington, DC: National Academy of Social 
Insurance, 183–229.
Weber, Max, 1994: Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Whiteford, Peter/Edward Whitehouse, 2006: Pension Challenges and Pension Reforms in OECD 
Countries. In: Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22, 78–93.
Williamson, John/Stephan Haggard, 1994: The Political Conditions of Economic Reform. In: John 
Williamson (ed.), The Political Economic of Policy Reform. Washington, DC: Institute for Inter-
national Economics, 525–597.
World Bank, 2006: World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Recent Titles in the Publication Series of the MPIfG
MPIfG Discussion Papers
DP 10/8
M. Höpner, A. Schäfer
Polanyi in Brussels? 
Embeddedness and the Three 
Dimensions of European 
Economic Integration
DP 10/7
R. Karadag
Neoliberal Restructuring 
in Turkey: From State to 
Oligarchic Capitalism
DP 10/6
L. Dobusch, S. Quack
Urheberrecht zwischen 
Kreativität und Verwertung: 
Transnationale Mobilisierung 
und private Regulierung 
DP 10/5
W. Streeck, D. Mertens
Politik im Defizit: Austerität als 
fiskalpolitisches Regime
DP 10/4
J. Beckert
The Transcending Power of 
Goods: Imaginative Value in 
the Economy
DP 10/3
M. Höpner, T. Müllenborn
Mitbestimmung im 
Unternehmensvergleich: 
Ein Konzept zur Messung 
des Einflusspotenzials der 
Arbeitnehmervertreter im 
mitbestimmten Aufsichtsrat
DP 10/2
G. Möllering
Collective Market-Making 
Efforts at an Engineering 
Conference
MPIfG Working Papers
WP 10/6
S. Neckel
Refeudalisierung der 
Ökonomie: Zum Struktur-
wandel kapitalistischer 
Wirtschaft
WP 10/5 
R. Mayntz
Legitimacy and Compliance in 
Transnational Governance
WP 10/4
S. Kirchner
Organizational Identities 
and Institutions: Dynamics of 
the Organizational Core as a 
Question of Path Dependence
WP 10/3
W. Streeck, D. Mertens
An Index of Fiscal Democracy
WP 10/2
M. Höpner
Warum betreibt der 
Europäische Gerichtshof 
Rechtsfortbildung? Die 
Politisierungshypothese
WP 10/1
J. Beckert, W. Streeck (Hg.)
Die deutschen 
Sozialwissenschaften 
und die Gründung des 
Max-Planck-Instituts für 
Gesellschaftsforschung:
Ariane Leendertz, Reimar Lüst 
und Franz-Xaver Kaufmann 
über die Signaturen einer 
Umbruchzeit
MPIfG Books
P. Aspers
Orderly Fashion:  
A Sociology of Markets
Princeton University Press, 2010
M.-L. Djelic, S. Quack (eds.)
Transnational Communities: 
Shaping Global Economic 
Governance
Cambridge University Press, 
2010 
B. Apitzsch
Flexible Beschäftigung, 
neue Abhängigkeiten: 
Projektarbeitsmärkte und 
ihre Auswirkungen auf 
Lebensverläufe
Campus, 2010
F. W. Scharpf
Community and Autonomy: 
Institutions, Policies and 
Legitimacy in Multilevel Europe
Campus, 2010 
J. Beckert,  
C. Deutschmann (Hg.)
Wirtschaftssoziologie
VS-Verlag, 2009 
S. Freye
Führungswechsel: Die 
Wirtschaftselite und das Ende 
der Deutschland AG
Campus, 2009
C. Crouch, H. Voelzkow
Innovation in Local Economies: 
Germany in Comparative 
Context
Oxford University Press, 2009 
Ordering Information
MPIfG Discussion Papers
Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will 
be billed) or download PDF files from the MPIfG 
website (free).
MPIfG Working Papers
Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will 
be billed) or download PDF files from the MPIfG 
website (free).
MPIfG Books
At bookstores; abstracts on the MPIfG website.
www.mpifg.de
Go to Publications.
New Titles
Consult our website for the most complete and up-
to-date information about MPIfG publications and 
publications by MPIfG researchers. To sign up for 
newsletters and mailings, please go to Service on the 
MPIfG website. Upon request to info@mpifg.de, we 
will be happy to send you our Recent Publications 
brochure.
ERPA
MPIfG Discussion Papers and MPIfG Working Papers 
in the field of European integration research are 
included in the European Research Papers Archive 
(ERPA), which offers full-text search options:  
http://eiop.or.at/erpa.
